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Abstract 
 
This study conducts a comprehensive analysis of the economic benefits and costs of credit 
default swap (CDS) in credit markets since its inception. Consistent with its role of insuring 
credit risk, the introduction of CDS reduces illiquidity and liquidity risk more for speculative 
grade bonds with high credit risk than investment grade ones. More importantly, CDS 
significantly improves the price convergence between investment grade bonds and CDS spreads 
through a popular trading strategy—CDS-bond basis arbitrage in normal period. In the recent 
crisis, however, CDS fails to reduce the prolonged price divergence between the two markets 
plausibly due to the lack of arbitrage. Overall, the economic impact of CDS is dependent on the 
prevailing trading strategies in the credit markets.  
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“There is a dearth of serious empirical studies on the social benefits and costs of credit default 
swaps and other derivatives—not just in the last two years, but in the last several decades.” 
— Stulz, JEP, 2010, Pg. 18 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Credit default swap (CDS) is one of the most prominent financial innovations in recent years. 
Since its introduction, market practices have been significantly changed in the investment, 
trading, and management of credit risk. 1  Traditional finance theory suggests that credit 
derivatives can increase economic welfare by facilitating credit-risk sharing among investors, 
improving price discovery, and making capital allocation more efficient (e.g., Stulz, 2010; 
Jarrow, 2010). On the other hand, recent empirical evidence reveals that the exposure created by 
CDS and the trading of the CDS can heighten the vulnerability of financial markets, which has 
been manifested in the recent financial crisis (e.g., Duffie, 2010; Mitchell and Pulvino, 2012). 
Nevertheless, the extant literature still lacks a comprehensive empirical analysis on the economic 
roles played by CDS in credit markets (Stulz, 2010). Our study intends to fill this void.  
We examine the economic impact of CDS on corporate bond market and CDS market since 
its inception. Our first empirical exploration focuses on the insurance role provided by CDS for 
credit risk because CDS allows traditional buy-and-hold bond investors to pass their credit risk to 
others who want to bear it directly. If this insurance benefit is indeed provided by CDS for 
marginal bond investors, we shall expect that those bonds with high credit risk benefit more from 
the availability of CDS than other bonds. Our results confirm this conjecture: the illiquidity level 
of speculative grade bonds is about 27% lower than investment grade bonds after CDS became 
available. The illiquidity measures we use include the number of zero-trading days, the number 
of transactions, trading volume, turnover, the trade size, and the Amihud measure (2002). 
Moreover, we also find that the return compensation for liquidity risk is reduced by about 1% per 
year for speculative grade bonds compared to investment grade bonds. These results suggest that 
CDS facilitates a better trading for those bonds with higher credit risk than other bonds.  
                                                 
1 See Rajan, McDermott, and Roy (2007) and D'Arcy, McNichols, and Zhao (2009) for a review of the credit 
derivatives markets. 
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Since CDS is introduced, it has also been widely used by investment banks, hedge funds and 
other speculators to "arbitrage" the mispricing of the credit risk of the same company in the cash 
and derivatives markets through the so-called CDS-Bond basis trade. The CDS-Bond basis (the 
basis hereafter) is defined as the difference between the CDS spread of a reference firm and the 
spread of the firm's cash corporate bond with similar maturity. Many studies have shown that 
CDS spread and credit spread follow a co-integrated process since they measure the credit risk of 
the same company.2 Investors can arbitrage away non-zero basis if the two markets are expected 
to converge in the future. When the basis is negative (positive), one can long (short) the 
underlying corporate bond and buy (sell) CDS to bet on the narrowing of the basis. In practice, 
the negative basis arbitrage is more popular than the positive basis arbitrage because it is more 
difficult to short sell cash bonds. In theory, arbitrage helps to bring market prices of the securities 
closer to their fundamental values and keep market efficient (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Hence, 
if arbitrage activities are engaged by marginal investors after CDS became available, we shall 
expect that the current price mis-alignment between the bond and CDS markets may lead to 
future price convergence as a result of the arbitrage. This line of reasoning provides us with a 
second empirical hypothesis that the mis-pricing between bond and CDS spreads predicts future 
bond returns and CDS spread change through the arbitrage activity.  
We take four progressive steps to test the hypothesis. First, we compute the level of basis—a 
measure of price mis-alignment between CDS and each corporate bond of the same firm. We 
find that investment grade bonds with more negative basis are older and smaller, and have lower 
rating, longer maturity, higher coupon, duration and convexity. However, we do not find such a 
clear relation between the basis and the various characteristics of speculative grade bonds. The 
results are consistent with the market understanding that certain investment grade bonds are 
more prone to the mis-pricing than other bonds and therefore become the targets of the basis 
arbitrage (e.g., Deutsche Bank, 2009).  
Second, we construct quintile bond portfolios based on their past basis levels and see whether 
there is a relation between the basis and future bond returns. The results show that the bond 
portfolios with negative basis earn positive returns in the future, indicating price convergence in 
the bond portfolios. On the contrary, we find that the bond portfolios with positive basis earn 
                                                 
2  Hull, Predescu and White (2004), Norden and Weber (2004), and Blanco, Brennan, Marsh, (2005), and 
Alexopoulou, Andersson and Georgescu (2009) among others have examined the parity relation between CDS and 
corporate bond spread. 
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positive future returns, indicating price divergence in these portfolios. Since most of the 
investment grade bond portfolios (four out of five) are associated with negative basis while most 
of the speculative grade bond portfolios are associated with positive basis, our results suggest 
that price convergence is more prevalent for investment grade bond portfolios.  
In the third step, we test whether the past price mis-alignment can also predict future 
movement of individual bonds. Similar to the results found in the bond portfolios, past basis 
predicts the future returns of investment grade bonds at a 1% significance level. In economic 
magnitude, one standard deviation increase in the current basis level predicts -10 basis points 
(bps) loss in the future return on an annual basis. The negative relation between the basis and 
future returns represents price convergence in the bonds. Our robustness tests also eliminate 
three alternative hypotheses that can explain these results. Specifically, we include past CDS 
spread as a control variable to reduce the concern that the predictability is caused by the leading 
information from CDS spreads for the bonds in pricing credit risk. If marginal investors are only 
using CDS to insure the credit risk of their bond investments, we expect that the relation between 
past CDS spread and future bond returns be significantly negative. However, such relation is not 
found in the analysis. Moreover, we also include past change of CDS spread and past bond 
returns as additional control variables to demonstrate that the price convergence we found is not 
due to the reversals in CDS spreads or bond returns. The results in speculative grade bonds are 
largely similar in the signs of the coefficients of the basis across different model specifications 
but not in terms of statistical significance. This result shows that the price convergence in 
speculative grade bonds via the arbitrage is more plausibly contaminated by other noise traders, 
and is also consistent with our previous result that the basis is not related to the characteristics of 
these bonds in a clear pattern. 
In the final step, we test the predictability of the basis for future CDS spread movements to 
confirm that the basis arbitrage is the leading explanation for the price convergence between the 
two credit securities involved in the basis trade. Indeed, our results show that the past basis 
predicts price convergence in investment grade CDS spread change at the 10% significance level. 
On average, one standard deviation increase in the basis predicts a 5% reduction in the CDS 
spread in the future. On the other hand, we do not find any significant predictability of the basis 
for the speculative grade CDS spreads. In comparison to the basis predictability for the 
investment grade bonds, it is not surprising to find that the predictability for the investment grade 
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CDS spreads is statistically weaker because the CDS market is much bigger in sheer size and 
much more liquid than corporate bond market in the normal period.  
To sum up, we find strong and consistent evidence that CDS leads to price convergence 
between the investment grade bonds and CDS spreads in the normal period. Such prediction is 
not driven by the insuring role of CDS for credit risk or by price reversals in the markets, but is 
likely due to a popular trading strategy in a normal market condition –CDS-bond basis arbitrage.  
It is important to note that recent literature shows that the two credit markets have 
experienced significant price disruptions during the 2007-2008 financial crisis (e.g., Fontana, 
2010; Bai and Collin-Dufresne, 2011). Duffie (2010) attributes the prolonged deviation between 
CDS spreads and credit spreads of corporate bonds to the lack of arbitrageurs and arbitrage 
capital. Similarly, Mitchell and Pulvino (2012) show that the loss of confidence about primary 
brokers and the subsequently spillover to the rehypothecation lenders and their clients—hedge 
funds slow down the movement of investment capital. Hence, we will examine whether the 
beneficial role of CDS continues to hold when the prevailing trading activities are adversely 
affected by the limits of arbitrage in the crisis. This is our third empirical hypothesis.  
The first test shows that past negative basis leads to negative future returns in both 
investment grade and speculative grade bond portfolios. Since on average, the basis is much 
more negative in the crisis period, the result indicates that a high level of mis-pricing leads to 
price divergence in the bonds, opposite to what happens in the normal period. We continue the 
test at the individual bond level. We find that past negative basis still predicts price convergence 
in investment grade bonds, but the insuring role of the CDS is much more dominant for 
investment grade bonds, leading to an overall price divergence in the bonds. As for the 
speculative grade bonds, the predictability of the basis for the returns can be completely 
explained away by past CDS spread and the price reversals in the bonds.  
More importantly, past basis can no longer predict any convergence in the CDS spreads at all 
in the crisis, unlike before in the normal period. After we control for past CDS spreads, we 
actually find that the basis leads to significant price divergence in the CDS spreads in the future. 
This result suggests that the basis arbitrage may lose money due to uncertainty in the CDS 
movement. Hence, combining the results found in the two markets, we conclude that CDS fails 
to reduce the price divergence between corporate bonds and CDS spreads in the crisis, plausibly 
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due to the lack of basis arbitrage as it can incur significant losses due to high uncertainty in price 
movements of the CDS spreads.  
In summary, we find that CDS provides the insurance for credit risk and offers new trading 
opportunities to reduce the mis-pricing of credit risk in the related credit securities. When CDS is 
initially introduced, we observe the insurance role of CDS is more significantly manifested in the 
bonds with high credit risk through the reductions of illiquidity and liquidity risk. In the normal 
market condition, we also observe that the marginal investors of investment grade credit 
securities enjoy better price discovery through arbitrage activities that are made available by 
CDS. However, in the financial crisis, we observe that such improvement of price efficiency 
largely disappears because the usual arbitrage may incur great losses due to heightened market 
uncertainties. Although conventional rational finance theory would suggest that significant price 
mis-alignment shall attract new investors to arbitrage away the mis-pricing, but the literature has 
shown that alternative investment capital fails to flow in time to profit from the prolonged price 
divergence in the two credit markets during the crisis because of inattention or fear. Hence, the 
beneficial role of CDS through arbitrage activities is greatly hindered by the prevailing trading 
activities in the crisis. Still, CDS continues to provide credit risk insurance even during the crisis.  
The contribution of our study is four folded. First, this study is among the first to provide a 
comprehensive empirical analysis on the positive and negative pricing impacts of CDS on the 
credit markets including corporate bond and CDS markets. We find that the pricing impact of 
CDS is highly dependent on the prevailing trading activities of CDS in the markets. Our results 
provide empirical support for the economic roles played by CDS as suggested in theory by Stulz 
(2010) and Jarrow (2010). We find that CDS provides insurance for credit risk and improves 
market efficiency in normal period but doesn’t help much when investors arbitrage much less. 
Second, our study also complements the existing literature that examines the impact of CDS 
trading on different security markets such as equity, option, and corporate bond markets (e.g., 
Boehmer, Chava, and Tookes, 2011; Acharya and Johnson, 2007; Das, Kalimipalli, and Nayak, 
2011). Most of the prior studies conclude with a negative impact of CDS on the equity or bond 
markets. Our paper finds two positive roles of the credit derivative in corporate bond market 
such as providing insurance for credit risk and improving price discovery in normal market 
condition. A recent study also examines the impact of sovereign CDS market on the sovereign 
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bond market and finds some positive effects of the sovereign CDS there as well (e.g., Ismailescu 
and Philips, 2012).  
Third, our findings also shed lights on how arbitrage force affects fixed income securities as 
a result of the introduction of CDS. Prior literature such as Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) and 
Duarte, Longstaff, and Yu (2007) have documented significant rewards for risky arbitrage 
strategies. A related study by Arora, Gandhi, and Longstaff (2012) also show that the market 
friction such as counterparty risk is priced in CDS. Consistent with these findings, we also find 
that trading strategies based on past basis—an empirical proxy of mis-pricing can generate 
significant abnormal returns on the portfolio level.  
Lastly, our study also contributes to the existing literature on CDS-bond basis. While earlier 
literature mainly focuses on the co-integration of CDS and bond spread, some recent studies 
have examined the existence and determinants of the basis. For example, Bai and Collin-
Dufresne (2011) show that funding liquidity risk, counterparty risk, and collateral quality jointly 
determine the basis level. Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam and Mahanti (2011) find that some 
determinants of the basis are related to a bond's accessibility, liquidity, and probably short-sale 
constraints faced by bond investors. Trapp (2009) shows that the basis is related to bond, CDS, 
and market-wide liquidity measures. Fontana (2010) also finds that basis dynamics is driven by 
economic variables such as funding liquidity, market liquidity and counterparty risk. Our paper 
differs from these studies in fundamental ways. Instead of finding the determinants of the basis, 
we employ the basis as a convenient proxy for the level of mis-pricing between the two credit 
markets and examine the impact of CDS through an arbitrage trading strategy to reduce such 
mis-pricing. The arbitrage works well in normal market condition and improves price efficiency 
in bond market but not as well in the crisis when arbitrage activities are limited by market 
imperfections. As far as we know, this is the first study that relates the arbitrage activity to the 
economic role of the derivatives in the related markets. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses how CDS affects the 
liquidity of corporate bonds since its introduction. Section 3 presents the impact of CDS on both 
the corporate bond market and the CDS market during the normal period by focusing on the role 
of CDS to reduce mis-pricing between the bond and CDS market. Section 4 investigates the 
impact of CDS on both credit markets during the recent financial crisis and section 5 concludes.   
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2. The Impact of CDS on Corporate Bond Liquidity 
 
A CDS is essentially an insurance contract, in which the protection buyer pays a premium 
(called the CDS spread) to the protection seller periodically for protection against the default of a 
reference entity. A credit event, such as bankruptcy, triggers a contingent payment from the 
seller to the buyer. The payment could be in the form of physical settlement, in which the seller 
receives the defaulted bond and pays par to the buyer, or cash settlement, in which the seller pays 
the difference between the par and the recovery value of the bond. CDS makes it much more 
convenient to trade the credit risk of a reference entity. While in the past investors have to 
borrow and sell the cash bond of a company to short its credit risk, right now this can be easily 
accomplished by buying the CDS of the company. Since CDS improves the transparency of the 
pricing of credit risk, it is natural to expect that CDS may improve the liquidity in corporate 
bonds after it is introduced at the end of 1998. Hence, our first hypothesis is as the followings, 
Hypothesis 1: CDS improves the liquidity of the corporate bonds with high credit risk 
more than that of the bonds with low credit risk.  
We conduct several empirical tests on this conjecture both at the individual bond level and 
the portfolio level.  
 
2.1. The Impact on the Illiquidity of Individual Bonds 
At the individual bond level, if the availability of CDS helps bond investors to insure the 
credit risk of the bond investment, we shall expect that the liquidity level of the bond be 
improved as a result of the introduction of CDS. To verify the hypothesis, we need to construct 
bond-level liquidity measures and compare them before and after the inception of CDS. We 
employ two bond transaction databases NAIC and TRACE from 1994 to 2008 to perform the 
analysis. The two databases have been widely used in the recent literature.3 We further merge 
                                                 
3 TRACE was officially launched in 2002 by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which replaced 
NASD, to disseminate secondary over-the-counter (OTC) corporate bond transactions by its members. TRACE 
gradually increases its coverage of the bond market over time. By July 1, 2005, FINRA requires all its members to 
report their trades within 15 minutes of the transaction. Nowadays, TRACE covers all trades in the secondary over-
the-counter market for corporate bonds and accounts for more than 99% of the total secondary trading volume in 
corporate bonds. The only trades not covered by TRACE are trades on NYSE, which are mainly small retail trades. 
The information contained in TRACE includes transaction dates and transaction price (clean price or price with 
commissions). We exclude transactions whose prices are mixed with commissions in our study. Due to limited 
coverage by TRACE before 2002, we supplement the bond transaction information from the NAIC database, which 
provides all corporate bond transactions by American Life, Health, Property and Casualty insurance companies 
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them with the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD) to obtain bond information, such as 
age, maturity, size, coupon, and credit ratings. In this paper, we only examine straight bonds that 
are non-convertible, non-callable, and non-putable with bi-annual fixed coupon payment.  
 We construct six commonly used liquidity measures used in the literature. We re-define them 
in such a way that a higher value always represents a higher illiquidity level. The measures 
include zero-trading days within a month (namely, Zero Trade), the inverse of the logarithm of 
trading volume (1/Volume), the inverse of the total number of transactions of each bond per 
month (1/Trades), the inverse of the turnover rate (1/Turnover), the logarithm of the total trading 
volume divided by the number of total trades in each month (Trade Size), and the Amihud (2002) 
measure (Amihud). Amihud (2002) constructs the illiquidity measure based on the theoretical 
model of Kyle (1985) to measure the price impact of a trade. We apply the measure for each 
bond i in month t as follows, 
     
-1
-1
,
1
-
| |
1 ,
j j
Nt j
i t
jt j
P P
P
Amihud
N Q
      (1) 
where Pj is the transaction j’s price on day t, Qj is the volume of the transaction j, and Nt is the 
number of transactions on day t. We take the median of the daily Amihud measure for each bond 
in each month and multiply it by 10,000 as the original number is very small.  
 After winsorizing 1% of the data from the top and bottom in terms of the illiquidity measures, 
we report the summary statistics of the key variables in Panel A of Table 1.  
 [Insert Table 1 about Here] 
 Panel A shows that the mean of Zero Trade is 0.74, which implies that a bond trades about 
16 days apart within a month. The mean of 1/Volume is at 0.07 which represents an average 
volume per month is about US$2 million. Given that 1/Trades measure is at 0.44, an average 
bond trades 2.2 times every month. The mean of 1/Turnover is at 0.5, which implies that on 
average the bond turns over twice every month. The average Trade Size is at 6.2, which 
                                                                                                                                                             
since 1994. Insurance companies are estimated to hold between 33%-40% of corporate bonds and have completed 
12.5% of the dollar trading volume in TRACE-eligible securities during second half of 2002 (Schultz , 2001; 
Campbell and Taksler, 2003). A recent study by Lin, Wang and Wu (2011) also uses the combined dataset of NAIC 
and TRACE to study the liquidity risk in the corporate bond market. NAIC is an alternative to the no-longer 
available Lehman fixed income database on corporate bonds used in previous studies. When TRACE has no record 
of a bond's transaction, we keep the observation from NAIC if it is available. Moreover, whenever a bond price 
becomes available in TRACE, we drop the transactions from NAIC database thereafter. 
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translates to a transaction size of about $1 million per trade. The mean of Amihud measure is at 
0.3. This implies that a trade with size of $1 million will have a price impact of 0.3%. An 
average bond in our sample has a credit rating between A to A-, with 8 years-to-maturity, coupon 
rate of 7%, duration of 5 years and convexity of 46. 
 We run the following regression specification to test the introduction impact of CDS on bond 
illiquidity, 
 
, 1 99 , 2 99 , 3 07 ,
4 07 , 5 03 , 6 03 ,
7 , 8 , 9 , 10
                     
                     
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
i t i t i t
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  
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11 , 12 , ,
 
                       
i t
i t i t i t
Size
Duration Convexity    
 (2) 
where Dummy99 is a dummy variable that equals to 1 since January 1999 when CDS first became 
available and zero otherwise, Dummy07 is a dummy variable that equals to 1 after September 
2007 when Lehman collapsed and zero otherwise, Dummy03 is a dummy variable that equals to 1 
after April 2003 when TRACE started to report most of the investment grade bond transactions 
and zero otherwise,4 IG is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the bond is an investment grade 
bond and zero otherwise, HY is a dummy variable for speculative grade bonds, Ratings are the 
credit ratings of the bond, 5 Maturity is the time to maturity of the bond, Coupon is the annual 
coupon rate, Issue Size is the natural logarithmic of the outstanding amount of bonds, Duration is 
the duration of the bond, and Convexity is the convexity of the bond. In the regression analysis, 
we standardize all six illiquidity measures with a mean value of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. 
Hence, we can directly compare the estimated coefficients across all six illiquidity measures.  
 Panel B of Table 1 reports the regression results of equation (2) and the standard errors are 
robust errors and clustered by each bond. We find that the introduction of CDS that is proxied by 
Dummy99 is related to lower 1/Trades and Trade Size for all bonds. This implies that the number 
of transactions increases and each trade is associated with a smaller transaction size after 1999. 
Moreover, the coefficient of Dummy99 for the illiquidity measure Zero Trade is lower for 
                                                 
4 Dick-Nielsen, Feldhüter, and Lando (2012) explains that there are three stages of the launch of TRACE. The first 
stage occurred in July 2002 and the 3rd stage occurred in October 2004. The second stage took place in April 2003 
when it started to include hundreds of BBB bonds in addition to all bonds with A3/A- above. Hence, the majority of 
investment grade bonds have been included in TRACE by then.  
5 We use Standard and Poor's (S&P) rating whenever available, followed by Moody's and Fitch's rating. We assign a 
value of 1 to the highest rating (AAA for S&P or Aaa for Moody's) and 25 to the lowest rating (D for S&P or D for 
Fitch). We assign values between 2 and 24 for intermediate ratings. 
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speculative grade bonds but is higher for investment grade bonds. The average reduction of the 
three illiquidity measures for speculative grade bonds is about 31% compared to that of the 
investment grade bonds as a result of the availability of CDS. The other two illiquidity measures, 
1/Volume and Amihud increases for all bonds, but the increases are smaller for speculative grade 
bonds, about 8.5 percent less than those of investment grade bonds. 1/Turnover is the only 
illiquidity measure among the six measures that increases more for speculative grade bonds, but 
the difference between the investment and speculative grade bonds is very small in economic 
magnitude. Overall, we find that five out of six illiquidity measures are lower for speculative 
grade bonds after 1999 by 22% on average in comparison to those of investment grade bonds. 
 The validity of the six illiquidity measures can be verified through the coefficients of the 
dummy variable, Dummy03 that captures the improvement of corporate bond market transparency 
through the dissemination of transaction data TRACE (e.g., Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar, 2007; 
Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri, 2007; Dick-Nielsen, Feldhüter, and Lando, 2012). The signs of 
the estimates confirm prior findings that bond-level illiquidity is reduced for all bonds after 
TRACE was widely distributed in terms of Zero Trade, 1/Trades, and Trade Size. The reductions 
in these illiquidity measures are unanimously more significant for speculative grade bonds. 
Furthermore, the other two illiquidity measures, 1/Volume and Trade Size also show that 
illiquidity drops more for speculative grade bonds. Hence, the bonds with higher credit risk 
bonds also benefit more from the improvement of data transparency in the bond market.  
 It is also interesting to note that during the recent financial crisis that is proxied by Dummy07, 
the three illiquidity measures such as Zero Trade, 1/Trades and Trade Size drop more for 
speculative grade bonds than for investment grade bonds. However, other illiquidity measures 
such as 1/Volume and Amihud increase more for speculative grade bonds. These findings are 
largely consistent with the mixed results in Friewald, Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam (2012), 
suggesting that different illiquidity proxies may capture different aspects of bond illiquidity.  
Undoubtedly, one can argue that the model specified in equation (2) is coarse in capturing the 
exact availability of the CDS contract because not every CDS is introduced at the same time by 
the end of 1998. Hereafter, we try to improve the measure of CDS introduction by using a more 
refined construct than before. Following the approach of Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and Saretto 
and Tookes (2012), we merge the CDS data from Markit with the earlier sample of the monthly 
corporate bond data. The CDS quotes from Markit span from 2001 to 2008. We focus on the 
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standardized 5-year CDS contracts for physical settlement that are senior unsecured with 
modified restructuring clauses and are denominated in U.S. dollar. When the specified CDS 
spread became available for the first time in the Markit database, the dummy variable DummyCDS 
takes the value of 1 from that month onwards to represent the availability of the CDS for the 
related bond, and zero otherwise.  
We re-run the regression model specified in equation (2) by replacing the dummy variable 
Dummy99 by the new dummy variable DummyCDS. Compared to the previous measure, the new 
measure may still have embedded mis-matching issue because some CDS prices can become 
available since 1999 but Markit database only started in January 2001. Hence, we continue to 
interpret the findings with cautious as before. 
Panel C of Table 1 reports the new specification regression results with robust and clustered 
standard errors. Generally, the patterns are similar to the prior results. Five out of the six 
illiquidity measures except Amihud measure are lower for speculative grade bonds than for 
investment grade bonds after the related CDS became available. On average, the reduction in the 
five illiquidity measures is about 31%. Consistent with the earlier results in panel B of Table 1, 
the coefficients of the DummyCDS for the illiquidity measures such as Zero Trade, 1/Trades, 
Trade Size are much more negative for speculative grade bonds than investment grade bonds. 
Moreover, the coefficients of the DummyCDS are negative for the illiquidity measure 1/Volume 
and zero for the measure 1/Turnover for speculative grade bonds whereas they are both positive 
for investment grade bonds. The illiquidity measure Amihud does not show much difference for 
both types of bonds. 
Taking together the results from both tests, our findings suggest that the illiquidity of the 
speculative grade bonds is on average 27% lower than that of investment grade bonds after CDS 
became available, supporting Hypothesis 1 at the individual bond level.  
 
2.2. The Impact on the Liquidity Risk of Bond Portfolios 
The literature has shown that bond-market liquidity risk is also priced in corporate bond 
market in addition to bond liquidity.6 In this section, we examine whether the pricing of the 
                                                 
6 For example, Chacko (2005), Ericsson and Renault, 2006; Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2005), Lin, Wang and 
Wu (2011), and Dick-Nielsen, Fedlhütter and Lando (2012) have shown that bond-market liquidity risk is priced in 
the corporate bond market while other studies, such as Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005), Chen, Lesmond and Wei 
(2007) and Bao, Pan and Wang (2011) show that the liquidity level affects corporate bond prices.  
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liquidity risk is affected by the availability of CDS for corporate bond portfolios.7 Following the 
approach of Das, Kalimipalli, and Nayak (2011), we merge the CDS data from Markit with the 
corporate bond pricing databases from 2001 to 2006.8 As a CDS contract is written against an 
underlying firm, we sort all bonds first into two groups (cross-sectional and time series): those 
that are issued by the firm of which there is a CDS contract and those without. We name the 
bonds as pre-CDS and post-CDS bonds. Given the differences we found in investment grade 
bonds (IG) and speculative grade bonds (HY) from the previous section, we also sort bonds into 
the two rating groups respectively. After the double sorting, we have four groups of bonds, such 
as Pre-CDS IG bonds, Pre-CDS HY bonds, Post-CDS IG bonds, and Post-CDS HY bonds. Panel 
A of Table 2 reports the number of firms, bonds and transactions in each of the four groups.  
[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
We observe that there are less bonds or firms without CDS as time passes by. The number of 
firms without CDS contracts declines from 169 in 2001 to 14 in 2006 and the number of bonds 
without CDS drops from 361 in 2001 to 31 in 2006. On the other hand, the number of bond 
transaction increases from 1,521 in 2001 to 3,326 in 2006. This latter result is plausibly due to 
the launch of bond transaction database TRACE since 2002 in various stages.  
Next, we perform the regression analysis of the bond portfolio returns on existing systematic 
risk factors to test whether the pricing of the bond-market liquidity risk varies across these four 
groups of bond portfolios. The regression model is specified as the followings, 
, , , 1 2 , , ,t k t f t k t k k t k tHPR r F F HY              (3) 
where HPRt-k,t is the equally-weighted or value-weighted k-day holding period return of the bond 
portfolios from day t-k to t (where k=20, 40, or 60), B is the beta loadings of all bond-market 
systematic risk factors F, and HY is a dummy variable that equals to 1 when it is the speculative 
grade bond portfolio.  
Before we construct the equally- and value-weighted returns for the four bond portfolios, we 
first compute the holding period return HPR for each bond i as the followings,  
                                                 
7 Unlike the tests of illiquidity on the individual bond level, we cannot conduct similar test of liquidity risk at the 
individual bond level because individual bond would have very high idiosyncratic risk whereas the liquidity risk we 
consider here is the systematic risk in the bond market. 
8 We stop the sample in 2006 because we do not want the recent financial crisis to contaminate our results given the 
previous findings that liquidity risk significantly increased during the recent financial crisis (e.g., Dick-Nielsen, 
Feldhüter, and Lando, 2012; Friewald, Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam, 2012). We will devote the entire section 4 
to show the impact of CDS during the financial crisis. 
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when Pi,t  is the closest available transaction price of bond portfolio i on day t, AIi,t is the accrued 
interest on day t, Ci,t-k,t is the coupon payment from day t-k to day t, Pi,t-k is the closest available 
transaction price of bond portfolio i on day t-k, AIi,t-k is the accrued interest on day t-k.9 We 
choose the three time horizons, namely 20 days, 40 days, and 60 days to overcome small sample 
issue as our final testing sample only spans from 2002 to 2006 after deleting those bonds with 
less than 5 transactions within the specified holding horizon. The three holding horizons 
approximate monthly, bi-monthly, and quarterly frequencies respectively in the usual asset 
pricing test. The conventional systematic risk factors F include MKT_kt, SMB_kt, HML_kt, 
DEF_kt, and TERM_kt which are standard systematic risk factors in Fama and French (1993) 
from day t-k to day t, LIQ_kt measures the liquidity level of the bond market and is defined as the 
turnover in the bond market as the ratio of logarithmic of total trading volume divided by the 
total number of bonds outstanding from day t-k to day t, and AMH_kt is the bond-market Amihud 
(2002) liquidity risk factor measured from day t-k to day t by following the exact construction 
procedures in Lin, Wang and Wu (2011). 
 
Panel B of Table 2 shows the summary statistics of all the systematic risk factors in percentage 
terms. There are no outliers in the risk factors. Panel C of Table 2 reports the regression results. 
The beta of the liquidity risk factor, AMH is significant for the HY bond portfolio in the post-
CDS period for 40- and 60-day horizons. The reduction in the liquidity risk beta for equally-
weighted HY portfolio is -0.28 at 20-day horizon and -0.42 at 60-day horizon. The reduction for 
value-weighted HY portfolio is slightly lower at -0.25 for 20-day horizon and -0.40 for 60-day 
horizon. The reduction is quite economically significant after taking into account the beta for 
liquidity risk is almost zero for IG bonds.10 In economic terms, the reduction of the liquidity risk 
translates to an annual return reduction of 1 percent for the HY bond portfolio compared to that 
                                                 
9 If there is no price available on day t, we check whether there is any transaction price on day t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4 and t-
5 in the order of priority. If there is no transaction price available on day t-k, we will check whether there is any 
transaction on day t-k-1, t-k-2, t-k-3, t-k-4, and t-k-5 in the order of priority. If there are no transactions within the 
five-day window, the bond will be deleted from our sample. 
10 Our finding here differs from Lin, Wang and Wu (2011) as we include the LIQ factor in our regression whereas 
their tests only include AMH factor. LIQ factor captures the liquidity level and our result shows that it is significant 
across most of the regression specification in Panel C of Table 2. This finding is also consistent with the prior 
literature that the liquidity level is priced in corporate bonds (e.g., Longstaff, Mithal and Neis, 2005; Chen, Lesmond 
and Wei, 2007; and Bao, Pan and Wang, 2011). 
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of the IG portfolio. Given that on average, the historical average annual return of bonds in past 
twenty years is about 5 percent, the 1 percent reduction in the return is economically significant.  
Overall, we find that after CDS became available, the corporate bonds with high credit risk 
such as speculative grade bonds experience significant reduction in bond-level illiquidity and 
portfolio-level liquidity risk compared to investment grade bonds. This finding reveals the 
CDS’s positive role of providing credit risk insurance more for speculative grade bond investors. 
   
3. The Impact of CDS on Credit Markets in Normal Period 
 
Since CDS is introduced at the end of 1998, it has made the trading of credit risk much easier 
than before. Besides buying CDS to insure the credit risk in the underlying bond investment, 
investors can also engage in other types of trading strategies such as CDS-bond basis arbitrage. 
We explore in this section the impact of CDS as a result of arbitrage activities during the normal 
period. First, we explain in details what the basis arbitrage is. Second, we compute the level of 
basis for each pair of CDS and bond and discuss how it is related to the usual bond 
characteristics. Third, we test whether the past basis can predict price convergence at bond 
portfolio level to infer the role of the basis arbitrage. Subsequently, we also test its predictability 
at the individual bond level. Lastly, we conduct the predictability test in the CDS market as well.  
 
3.1. CDS-Bond Basis Arbitrage  
A basis is defined as the difference between a CDS spread and a bond’s credit spread for the 
same company with the same maturity. Many studies have shown that CDS spreads and credit 
spreads are largely co-integrated because CDS and bond are two ways to invest in the credit risk 
of the same company and should have the same payoff in either default and at maturity. 
Therefore, non-zero basis presents trading opportunities for arbitrageurs if they expect the basis 
to narrow in the future. When the basis is positive, the arbitrageur can short the cash bond, which 
is typically done through a reverse repo, and sell a CDS on the same reference name with the 
same maturity and notional amount. When the basis is negative, an arbitrageur can buy the cash 
bond (probably need to use repo to fund the purchase) and buy a CDS on the same reference 
name. The arbitrageurs will hold their positions in both bond and CDS for a period of time till 
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the basis narrows. Then the arbitrageurs can unwind their initial positions to log into some profits. 
If the basis becomes widen, however, arbitrageurs will lose money. Hence, the expected 
profitability of the basis trade hinges on whether investors believe that the basis may narrow in 
the near horizon. Practically, it is more difficult for arbitrageurs to engage in long-term arbitrage 
trades because long-term financing is not easy to be obtained from bond securities lenders, 
especially during the recent financial crisis (e.g., Mitchell and Pulvino, 2012).  
Since the introduction of CDS, the basis trade has been very popular among hedge funds and 
proprietary trading desks at Wall Street firms (see e.g., Choudhry, 2006; JP Morgan, 2006). To 
engage in the basis arbitrage, arbitrageurs need to use short-term financing or borrow securities 
on the margin. If the margin requirements are perceived to change dramatically, the actual high 
financing cost (such as repo or reverse repo rate) can easily erode the arbitrageurs’ potential 
profits. Traders, while deciding on candidate bonds for the basis trade, tend to consider bonds 
with funding spreads between -500 basis points (bps) and 1000 bps, which would usually rule 
out distressed bonds (e.g., Deutsche Bank, 2009). A positive funding spread is usually related to 
a negative basis, which indicates that a bond is cheaper than CDS. In practice, the negative basis 
trade is more popular than the positive basis trade. 
During the few years before the recent financial crisis when credit was easily available, 
arbitrageurs also tend to lever up the basis trade many times to magnify the profits from small 
price discrepancies. However, when such highly levered arbitrageurs face a sudden shortage of 
capital or funding liquidity shock, their deleveraging activities can cause significant price 
distortions in the related markets. Moreover, there existed significant heightening of counterparty 
risk as a result of bankruptcies of some major bond securities lenders. Hence, the role of CDS in 
the crisis might be significantly different from that in the normal period because usual investors 
face constraints. Hence, we examine the role of CDS in the normal period and crisis period 
separately.  
Our second empirical hypothesis focuses on the role of CDS in the normal market condition,  
Hypothesis 2: CDS leads to a more efficient price discovery in corporate bond and CDS 
markets through CDS-Bond basis arbitrage in normal period.  
Given that the Hypothesis 2 makes two conjectures for the bond and CDS markets, we break it 
down to two sub-hypotheses for each market respectively,  
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Hypothesis 2a: CDS leads to a more efficient price discovery in corporate bond market 
through CDS-Bond basis arbitrage in normal period. 
Hypothesis 2b: CDS leads to a more efficient price discovery in CDS market through 
CDS-Bond basis arbitrage in normal period.  
For basis arbitrageurs to make money there must be a sufficient level of price mis-alignment 
between the two credit securities such as bonds and CDS in the first place. The second 
consideration for arbitrageurs is whether they expect price convergence to occur in the future. 
We examine how the arbitrage affects the bond market first and then move on to the CDS market.  
 
3.2. CDS-Bond Basis and Bond Characteristics 
To understand how the arbitrage impacts the bond market, we first compute the basis level 
for each bond, and then we study how the basis level is related to the usual bond characteristics 
as well as bond returns. To compute the basis, we focus on senior-unsecured fixed-rate straight 
bonds with semi-annual coupon payments. We delete bonds without credit ratings from any of 
the three rating agencies (i.e., Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch). We also delete bonds with 
embedded options (callable, puttable, or convertible bonds), floating coupons, and less than one 
year to maturity from 2001 to 2006. On the other hand, CDS spreads are obtained from Markit 
and are quoted in basis points per year for a notional amount of $10 million. While previous 
studies have mainly focused on CDS contracts with five year maturity, we use the complete 
credit curve of CDS spreads for 6 month, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, and 30 year maturities for most 
companies to match with different bonds. Panel A of Table 3 shows the number of bonds and 
firms in each year of the sample. We have on average 236 firms and 862 bonds in investment 
grade and 62 firms and 180 bonds in speculative grade per year.  
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
The basis for a given firm i at time t for a given maturity τ is defined as 
, , , , , , ,i t i t i tBasis CDS Z       (5) 
where CDSi,t,τ (Zi,t,τ ) is the CDS (bond) spread of firm i at time t for maturity τ. While there are 
many different ways to compute the bond spread, in our empirical analysis, we mainly use Z-
spread, which has been widely used in industry in defining the basis according to Choudhry 
(2006). Z-spread is defined as a parallel shift of the credit curve such that the present value of 
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future cash flows equals to the current bond price. A simple definition of the Z-spread for a 3-
year plain vanilla bond with annual coupon is the value of Z that solves the following equation: 
2 3
1 2 3
1 ,
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
c c cP
s Z s Z s Z
         (6) 
where P is the current price of the bond with face value of 1, c is the coupon rate, si is the zero-
coupon yield to maturity based on the swap rate curve for a maturity of i year (where i = 1, 2, 
and 3). In order to compute basis, we first need to compute the Z-spread for each bond on each 
day in our dataset. Then we match the Z-spread with the CDS spread with the same maturity. In 
case we do not have the exact match for maturity, we linearly interpolate the CDS curve to 
obtain a CDS spread that has the same maturity as the bond. Then the basis for each bond is 
constructed by subtracting the Z-spread from the CDS spread. After matching, cleaning, and 
winsorizing by 1% at the bottom and the top, our final dataset has a total of 266,787 daily 
observations with investment grade and 63,125 with speculative grade from 2001 to 2006. 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the summary statistics of basis and bond characteristics. The 
average investment grade bond in our sample has a basis of -23 bps, has a rating between A and 
A-, 8 years to maturity, 5 years old, with a coupon rate of 6%, an issue size of $0.4 billion, a 
duration of 5 years, and a convexity of 57. The lowest basis for investment grade bond is -370 
bps and the highest is 98 bps. On the other hand, the average speculative grade bond in our 
sample has a basis of 73 bps, has a rating between BB- to B+, 8 years to maturity, 6 years old, 
with a coupon rate of 8%, an issue size of $0.3 billion, a duration of 5 years, and a convexity of 
47. The standard deviation of the basis for speculative grade bonds is at 216 bps, much higher 
than that of investment grade bonds that is about 51 bps. The range of the basis for speculative 
grade bonds is also much wider than investment grade bonds, ranging from -712 bps to 1521 bps. 
To examine the relation between the basis and bond characteristics, we sort the bonds into 
groups based on each of the characteristics and calculate the average basis in each group. Panel 
C of Table 3 present the results based on rating, maturity, age, coupon, issue size, duration, and 
convexity, respectively. The four rating groups for investment grade bonds are those with ratings 
of AAA, AA, A, and BBB respectively. The four rating groups for speculative grade bonds are 
those with ratings of BB, B, CCC, and CC. The five maturity groups contain bonds with 1-3, 3-5, 
5-7, 7-10 and more than 10 years to maturity. The five age groups contain bonds with less than 3, 
3-5, 5-7, 7-10 and more than 10 years of age. The five coupon groups consist of bonds with 
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annual coupon of 0-5.5%, 5.5%-6.5%, 6.5%-7%, 7-8% and more than 8%. The five issue size 
groups contain bonds with issue size of 0-0.2, 0.2-0.3, 0.3-0.5, 0.5-0.6 and more than 0.6 billions 
of dollars. The five duration groups contain bonds with duration of 0-3, 3-5, 5-7, 7-10 and more 
than 10 years. The five convexity groups contain bonds with convexity of 0-10, 10-30, 30-50, 
50-70 and more than 70. 
For investment grade bonds, there is a strict monotonic relation between the basis and rating, 
maturity, age, coupon, and duration. The lower the rating, the more negative the basis is. For 
example, the basis decreases from -3 bps for AAA bonds to -29 bps for BBB bonds. The 
standard deviation of the basis also increases as rating declines. The basis is strictly more 
negative for the bond that is older, with longer maturity, higher coupon and duration. 
Interestingly, although De Wit (2006) shows that the most liquid CDS is concentrated on 5 year-
to-maturity, the basis for the bond with 5 year-to-maturity is not the closest to zero, suggesting 
that basis level may be affected by other factors besides liquidity. The relations between the basis 
and issue size and convexity are largely monotonic except one group out of the five. The issue 
size group 1 (the smallest size) has the lowest basis at -35 bps and group 4 (instead of group 5) 
has the highest basis at -11 bps. The convexity group 1 has the least negative basis at -10 bps 
whereas the convexity group 5 has the most negative basis at -47 bps.  
However, for speculative grade bonds, the relations between the basis level and bond 
characteristics are mostly non-monotonic. Rating is the only characteristic that is related to the 
basis level monotonically. Lower rating is associated with higher basis. For other characteristics, 
the lowest basis level mostly falls into characteristic group 2 or 3 (e.g., maturity, age, coupon, 
issue size and convexity). The other exception is for the Duration group 5 that has the least basis 
level at 32 bps.  
In summary, we find that the basis is mostly monotonically related to bond characteristics for 
investment grade bonds: the bond with more negative basis tends to be older and smaller, and 
have lower rating, longer maturity, higher coupon, higher duration, and higher convexity. The 
patterns are not clear for speculative grade bonds. These results suggest that the basis level can 
serve as a reasonable empirical proxy for arbitrage interests for the investment grade bonds as 
the bonds that are associated with higher level of non-zero basis are those bonds that are more 
likely to be mispriced. This result is also consistent with the recent finding that investment grade 
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bonds are more widely borrowed by short-term investors for plausible arbitrage from bond 
depository institutions (e.g., Asquith, Au, Covert, and Pathak, 2011). 
  
3.3. The CDS-Bond Basis and the Future Returns of Bond Portfolios 
If the basis is very significantly different from zero, which is not caused by technical 
differences, 11 investors may consider the under or overpricing of the credit spreads with respect 
to the related CDS spreads. Hence, they may explore such temporary mis-pricing opportunity if 
they believe that the prices shall be more aligned in the future. If such arbitrage trade does 
happen, the demand for bond will drive the bond price up if the current basis is negative and vice 
versa. Hence, our prediction is that basis shall be negatively related to future bond returns if 
arbitrage helps to improve price convergence. We now test how the past basis is related to the 
future returns of bond portfolios in the data.  
If basis is served as a measure of mis-pricing, we expect that bond market will converge in 
price to be better aligned with the CDS market. Hence, if the portfolio has a negative basis now, 
we expect the credit spread of the bond portfolio to decline, which implies a positive future 
return. On the other hand, if the portfolio has a positive basis, we expect the credit spread to 
increase, which implies a negative future return. Given the differences between investment grade 
and speculative grade bonds, we will examine them separately.  
We form five basis quintile bond portfolios based on their past 60-day basis levels on day t, 
we then compute the value-weighted returns of each portfolio from day t to day t+k (where k = 
20, 40, or 60 respectively). This way we can see how the past basis is related to the returns in 20-
day, 40-day, and 60-day holding horizons respectively. We believe that the 60-day holding 
horizon is a reasonable length to include most of arbitrage trades because the arbitrageurs need to 
                                                 
11 For example, as pointed out by Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005), one reason for the existence of non-zero basis 
is the contractual differences between cash bond and CDS contract as one might not be able to find a CDS with 
exactly the same maturity as the cash bond. A second deviation can arise from a default event when the accrued 
interest is paid upon default in CDS but it is not paid for defaulted bond. Thirdly, the interest payment of CDS is on 
a quarterly frequency whereas it is semi-annual for most cash bonds. Fourthly, the cheapest-to-deliver option 
embedded in CDS contract can be extremely valuable in some default events. The option gives the buyer the right to 
deliver the cheapest bond for the single name entity when a credit event occurs. For example, when Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac were put into conservatorship by their federal regulator, the companies' bonds increased in value 
because of government guarantees and the benefits of having embedded cheapest-to-deliver options (D.E. Shaw, 
2009). Lastly, CDS investors may not enjoy the same rights as those in cash corporate bonds either. Bolton and 
Oehmke (2011) highlight the empty creditor problem where debtholders and CDS holders have different preferences 
for bankruptcy resolution. 
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maintain costly daily borrowing or lending of the related interest rate securities and credit 
securities (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2012). 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the raw and excess holding period returns of the five value-
weighted basis portfolios from 2001 to 2006. The excess return is the difference between the raw 
return and the risk free rate during the same holding period. On average, each basis portfolio 
contains about 35 bonds. For four out of five investment grade basis portfolios with negative 
basis (ranging from -62 bps to -5 bps), the future returns are all positive at three different holding 
horizons, indicating price convergence for these bonds. In the fifth quintile portfolio with 
positive basis at 12 bps, the future return is still positive, indicating price divergence in this 
portfolio. Indeed, if investors buy the bond portfolio with the lowest basis (1st quintile) and sell 
the portfolio with the highest basis (5th quintile) at the same time, they can realize an average 
annual return of 3.7%. Hence, price convergence is more dominant for an average investment 
grade bond portfolio. 
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 
For speculative grade bond portfolios, only one of the five speculative grade basis portfolios 
has a negative basis at -70 bps on average and has a positive future return, indicating price 
convergence. However, the rest four portfolios with positive basis (ranging from 1 bps to 528 
bps) are related to positive future returns, indicating price divergence in the bonds. Moreover, the 
difference in the returns on the two extreme quintile portfolios with speculative grade is 
statistically and economically significant at -14.9% per year. Hence, price divergence is more 
dominant for an average speculative bond portfolio. 
Given the understanding that the negative basis arbitrage is more popular in reality as it may 
be costly to short the bonds to engage in positive basis arbitrage, the previous results indicate 
that the popular negative basis arbitrage is plausibly contribute to a better price convergence in 
most of the investment grade bonds and a few of the speculative grade bonds.  
Similar to many fixed-income arbitrage strategies, the basis arbitrage is not riskless. One 
important risk in the arbitrage is funding liquidity risk for arbitrageurs who purchase cash bonds 
using borrowed money. Margin requirements, perceived changes to margin requirements, terms 
of financing, conditions under which financing can be renewed or terminated, actual financing 
cost (such as repo or reverse repo rate) are all important considerations for evaluating funding 
risk (e.g., Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2011; Liu and Mello, 2011). Arbitrageurs also face 
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counterparty risk in the basis trade, the majority of which arises from the default risk of 
protections sellers. When highly levered arbitrageurs face a sudden shortage of capital or funding 
liquidity, their deleveraging activities can affect the basis level in a significant way, which could 
lead to deleveraging risk. The liquidity risks in both CDS and bond markets might affect the 
unwinding of the basis arbitrage positions. 12 Given that Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and 
Aragon and Strahan (2011) both suggest that market liquidity can interact with funding liquidity, 
such joint effect can complicate the risks involved in the basis arbitrage. Bai and Collin-Dufresne 
(2011) also point out that the collateral risk of the underlying bonds is another important 
consideration for the basis trade. Lastly, it is possible that the underlying firms are selling the 
cash bond and their affiliated financial institutions are also the sellers of the CDS contract. Hence 
the default risk of the cash bond and the counterparty risk embedded in the CDS can be highly 
correlated.  
Hence, if basis arbitrage is the plausible driving force of our previous results, we would 
expect that the returns from the previous step cannot be fully explained by the existing 
systematic risk factors documented in the corporate bond literature (such as Fama and French, 
1997; Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer, and Swaminathan, 2005; Lin, Wang and Wu, 2011) that do not 
include the above mentioned arbitrage risks such as funding liquidity, counterparty risk, and 
collateral risk. We verify through further asset pricing tests on the returns obtained from the 
previous step. Specifically, we regress the returns of the five basis quintile portfolios and the 
return difference of the two extreme portfolios on the existing systematic risk factors, such as 
MKT, SMB, HML, DEF, TERM, LIQ, and AMH risk factors defined in Table 2.  
, , , , , , , , , , ,
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      (7) 
where HPRq,t-k,t is the k-day holding period return of the basis quintile portfolio q formed on past 
60-day basis (q=1,2,…,5) from day t-k to t, MKT_kt, SMB_kt, and HML_kt are the three standard 
factors used in Fama and French (1993) from day t-k to day t, DEF_kt and TERM_kt are the two 
standard bond factors of Fama and French (1993) from day t-k  to day t, LIQ_kt measures the 
turnover in the bond market as the ratio of total trading volume divided by the total number of 
bonds outstanding from day t-k to day t, and AMH_kt is the Amihud (2002) liquidity risk factor 
                                                 
12 Many studies, such as Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001), 
and Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) have shown that liquidity is an important factor in the credit spreads of 
corporate bonds. Tang and Yan (2007) also find evidence that liquidity premium exists in CDS spreads. 
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measured from day t-k to day t. βm,q,k is the market beta, βsize,q,k is the SMB beta, βbm,q,k  is the 
HML beta, βdef,q,k  is the DEF beta, βterm,q,k  is the TERM beta, βl,q,k is the LIQ beta, and βamh,q,k is 
the Amihud liquidity beta. 13  If we find significantly positive intercept after estimating the 
equation (7), it indicates that the return is abnormal and is plausibly a reward for investors who 
bear the new arbitrage risks mentioned above.  
The regression results are reported in panel B to panel D of Table 4 for three different time 
horizons, 20- (panel B), 40- (panel C) or 60-day (panel D). Panel B shows that the abnormal 
return of each of the five quintile portfolio ranges from 3 bps to 5 bps per year for investment 
grade bonds. These results indicate that some part of the returns is abnormal for investment grade 
bonds, in support of the role of CDS-bond basis arbitrage. Interestingly, we do not find any 
abnormal return in speculative grade bonds in the 20-day horizon shown in panel B. These 
results again confirm our earlier conjecture that the arbitrage is more popular among investment 
grade bond investors than speculative grade bond investors.  
Panel C and D of Table 4 largely display similar results for 40-day and 60-day holding 
horizons. The abnormal returns for investment grade quintile portfolios are significantly positive, 
ranging from 8 bps to 25 bps. On the other hand, the results for speculative grade bonds are 
either insignificant or negative, contrary to the existence of any new arbitrage risk.  
In sum, we find that past basis can predict price convergence in bond portfolios if the basis is 
negative. Since most of the investment grade bond portfolios are associated with negative basis, 
they benefit more from the negative basis arbitrage than speculative grade bond portfolios. We 
also show that the returns from the arbitrage cannot be fully explained by the conventional 
systematic risk factors documented in the literature, suggesting the abnormal return may be a 
reward for new sources of risk involved in the arbitrage. In the next section, we test whether such 
results are found at the individual bond level.  
 
3.4. The CDS-Bond Basis and the Future Returns of Individual Bonds 
If the basis arbitrage is at force, we expect that past basis is also negatively related to future 
bond returns at the individual bond level. If investment grade bonds are more widely used in the 
                                                 
13 We have also constructed Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity risk measure as shown in Lin, Wang, and Wu 
(2011) and conducted robustness checks. The results are largely similar to the ones we report here. 
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basis arbitrage than speculative grade bonds, we expect that the prediction is stronger in the 
former group than the latter one.  
We consider the following Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression of excess return of each bond i 
on its past basis level, past bond characteristics, and past liquidity level: 
, , , , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 , 7 , ,                                    _ ,
i t t k f t t k i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
HPR r Basis Rating Maturity Age
Coupon Issue Size Indliq k
    
   
      
     (8) 
where HPRi,t,t+k is the k-day (where k = 20, 40, 60) holding period return for individual bond i 
from day t to t+k, rf,t,t+k is the cumulative risk free rate from day t to t+k, Basisi,t , Ratingi,t, 
Maturityi,t, Agei,t, Couponi,t, Issue Sizei,t, and Indliq_ki,t is the basis level, credit rating, maturity, 
age, coupon, issue size, and liquidity of bond i on day t, respectively. The liquidity factor 
Indliq_ki,t is the sum of the turnover of bond i that is defined as the total trading volume divided 
by the total amount outstanding for the bond between day t-k to day t. We run cross-sectional 
regression on each day and report the time series averages of the estimates of the coefficients. 
Robust Newey-West (1987) t-statistics of coefficients with 3 lags are reported in brackets. The 
results are reported in Model 1 of Panel A and Panel B in Table 5 for investment grade bonds 
and speculative grade bonds respectively.  
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 
Model 1 in Table 5 panel A shows that the coefficients of the basis are statistically 
significantly negative for investment grade bonds at a 1% significance level for all three holding 
horizons. The three coefficients of the basis factor range from -0.02 to -0.03. In economic terms, 
one standard deviation reduction in the basis can generate on average an annual return of 8 bps. 
Future positive bond return is related to past negative basis, implying that investment grade 
bonds experience significant convergence in the credit spread if the CDS spread is unchanged. 
On the other hand, the coefficients of other bond characteristics, such as credit rating, maturity, 
age, duration, and liquidity factors, are not consistently significant across different models and 
holding horizons.  
The prediction of basis for bond future return can also be a result of a more efficient price 
discovery in the CDS market than bond market (e.g., Zhu, 2004; Alexopoulou, Andersson and 
Georgesu, 2009). If this is the case, we include past CDS spread and see whether the 
predictability of basis disappears at the presence of the CDS spread information. Model 2 in 
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Table 5 panel A shows the results. Among 3 different holding horizons, the past basis continues 
to be negatively related to the future bond return, but statistically significant at the 5% level for 
the 20-day and 60-day horizons. The coefficients become more negative in Model 2 than in 
Model 1 as one standard deviation drop in basis predicts an average positive return of 17 bps.   
In addition to the explanatory power of past CDS spread, we also want to check whether the 
convergence of the bond price is a spillover effect of the convergence of the CDS spread itself. 
Hence, Model 3 further includes the change of past CDS spread as a control variable in addition 
to the past CDS spread. The results show that the basis continues to predict price convergence in 
the presence of past CDS change for 40-day and 60-day horizons at a 1% significance level.  
Lastly, another alternative explanation is that the explanatory power of the basis is driven by 
the return reversal observed in bonds.14 Model 4 in Table 5 panel A replaces the past CDS 
change by the past bond return as a control variable.15  We still observe that past basis is 
significantly and negatively related to future bond returns at the 40-day horizon, but the 
statistical significances of the coefficients of the other two horizons drop below the 10% 
significance level. Hence, we find that past bond returns may explain some portion of the basis 
predictability, but not completely. In sum, we find that the basis is a robust predictor for the 
future returns of individual investment grade bonds after we consider three alternative 
explanations, suggesting that the CDS-bond basis arbitrage is a more plausible reason. 
Similar to the results found at the portfolio level, we do not find statistically significant 
prediction power of the basis for the future speculative grade bond returns. Model 1 in Panel B of 
Table 5 shows that only the coefficient for 60-day horizon is statistically significant at the 10% 
level with a value of -0.0407. It represents that one standard deviation increase of the basis can 
predict a return of -32 bps on the annual basis. This result indicates that if the basis level is 
significantly negative for speculative grade bonds for a long period of time, then it may attract 
investors’ interests in arbitraging in speculative grade bonds as well. The coefficients of the past 
basis in Model 2 to Model 4 are mostly insignificant except for one. But the sign of the 
coefficients are largely negative. These results show that marginal investors of speculative grade 
bonds are very unlikely to be the basis arbitrageurs.  
                                                 
14 For example, Pospisil and Zhang (2010) have analyzed the predictability of the bond returns and found that return 
reversals are observed strongly among investment grade bonds. 
15 We do not include the past CDS spread, the change of CDS and bond returns altogether in the same regression to 
reduce the multi-collinearity concern because technically, basis is the difference between CDS spread and credit 
spread of the bond. When we include the past bond returns, we remove the past change of CDS spread in the model. 
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Overall, our results show that the basis has significant predictive power for future excess 
returns of individual investment grade bonds after controlling for well-known bond 
characteristics and liquidity measures. We verify that such predictability is not driven by the 
leading information of the CDS spread, or price reversals in the CDS or the bond markets. The 
predictable power of basis is much less significant statistically for speculative grade bonds. 
These results are also largely consistent with the anecdotal evidence that investment grade bonds 
are much more widely employed in the basis arbitrage (e.g., Deutsche Bank, 2009), and the 
recent finding in Asquith, Au, Covert, and Pathak (2011) that show 68.9% of the borrowed 
bonds are investment grade and are more likely to be fixed rate and less likely to default by using 
a proprietary database of bond loan transactions from a major depository institution from 2004 to 
2007. Bonds are likely to be borrowed or lent in the typical basis arbitrage. Hence, our empirical 
results support Hypothesis 2a.  
 
3.5. The Impact of CDS-Bond Basis Arbitrage in the CDS Market 
In this section, we test whether basis can predict future CDS spread change as well. If 
investors indeed engage in the basis arbitrage, they need to trade both in the bond and CDS 
markets at the same time. However, given that CDS market is much bigger and more liquid than 
the corporate bond market, the marginal investors in CDS market may not be basis arbitrageurs 
even if they are in the related bond market. According to the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS, 2010), the notional value of outstanding credit derivatives by the end of 2007 was 58 
trillion dollars, more than six times that of the corporate bond market as shown in Figure 1. 
Moreover, prior studies have also shown that CDS market leads bond market in price discovery 
in normal market condition (e.g., Zhu, 2004; Alexopoulou, Andersson and Georgesu, 2009; 
Coudert and Gex, 2010). In terms of liquidity, CDS market is also more liquid than the bond 
market as we use only the most liquid 5-year CDS spreads here in the prediction tests among all 
available CDS contracts (De Wit, 2006). Hence, we need to test the Hypothesis 2b explicitly.  
Following Tang and Yan (2011), we employ the following regression model to verify the 
prediction power of the past basis for the future change of CDS spread,  
, , 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , ,
( ) Stock Return (Stock Volatility)
(Leverage) (Size) (Profitability) (Cash ratio) ,
i t t k i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
CDS c Basis  
    
     
          (9) 
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where stock return is the percentage change in stock price for the past three months, i.e. from the 
four months to one months prior to the month when day t belongs to, ∆(Stock Volatility) is the 
change in stock volatility, defined as the standard deviation of daily stock prices for the past 
three months, ∆(leverage) is the change in market leverage, defined as the book value of debt 
divided by the market value of asset for the past three months, ∆(size) is the change in the 
logarithm of the market value of asset, defined as the book value of debt plus the market value of 
equity for the past three months, ∆(Profitability) is the change in profitability, defined as the 
income before the tax and interests divided by the market value of asset for the past three months, 
and ∆(Cash Ratio) is the change in the ratio of cash divided by the market value of asset for the 
past three months. We run Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions as before. The standard errors are 
Newey-West errors with 3 lags. 
Table 6 reports the results. Panel A and B report the summary statistics and the regression 
result for investment grade CDS spread change. Panel C and D report the summary statistics and 
the regression result for speculative grade CDS spread change. On average, there are 107,243 
observations for investment grade CDS spreads. The number is smaller than that of the 
investment grade bonds because some firms have multiple bonds but only one CDS spread. We 
compute the value-weighted basis for each CDS if there are multiple bonds related to the same 
CDS.  
Model 1 in panel B of Table 6 shows that the past basis is negatively related to the future 
change of CDS spread for all three horizons with an average coefficient of -0.03. In economic 
magnitude, one standard deviation increase of basis leads to a change of the CDS spread by -63 
bps in 20 days. The reductions are about -86 bps to -207 bps in 40 and 60 days respectively. 
These results indicate that the past basis also predicts the price convergence in CDS spread.  
[Insert Table 6 about Here] 
Model 2 includes the past CDS spread as a control variable. Model 3 further includes the 
change of CDS spread in past 60 days, and Model 4 includes past bond return instead. Same 
rationality as before applies here to include these control variables to eliminate alternative 
explanations. The coefficient of the past CDS spread is positive in Model 2 whereas the 
coefficient of the basis is still negative as before although not statistically significant at the 10% 
significance level. This result still reveals that the basis predicts the change of CDS spread 
opposite to that of the past CDS spread. The inclusion of the change of past CDS spread in 
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Model 3 has improved the prediction power of basis by two times than Model 1 and the 
coefficients of basis are statistically significantly negative at the 10% significance level. One 
standard deviation increase in the basis predicts a change of CDS spread by -104 bps, 340 bps, 
and -228 bps in 20-day, 40-day, and 60-day horizons. Model 4 shows that basis is negatively 
related to the CDS change in 40-day horizon even after the inclusion of the past bond returns at 
the 10% significance level. These results confirm that the basis arbitrage is plausibly the driving 
force for the price convergence in investment grade CDS spread rather than other reasons.  
We have a much smaller sample for the speculative grade CDS sample, a total of 24,514 
observations shown in panel C of Table 6. Panel D shows that the basis has no prediction power 
for speculative grade CDS spread across all three time horizons. This result, again, is consistent 
with our earlier findings that the basis does not improve the price convergence in the speculative 
grade bonds as they are much less employed in the conventional basis arbitrage. All these results 
support the Hypothesis 2b. 
In summary, we find that CDS leads to more efficient price convergence in investment grade 
bonds both at the portfolio and individual bond level through CDS-bond basis arbitrage. It also 
leads to better price convergence in investment grade CDS contracts. However, we find that the 
price convergence by the arbitrage is weak for speculative grade bonds and doesn’t work for the 
speculative grade CDS contracts. This is also consistent with anecdotal evidence that marginal 
investors in speculative grade bonds are not the basis arbitrageurs. Taking together, we find 
strong evidence that CDS improves price convergence between two credit markets through the 
basis arbitrage in the normal period. In the next section, we will examine the role of CDS in the 
recent financial crisis. 
 
4. The Impact of CDS on Credit Markets during the Crisis Period 
 
The recent literature has shown that both the corporate bond and CDS market had experienced 
significant price disruptions during the recent financial crisis. For example, both Duffie (2010) 
and Mitchell and Pulvino (2012) document a significant widening of negative basis in the crisis 
period for both investment grade and speculative grade credit securities. Such widening is further 
worsened by the unwinding of the basis trade because arbitrageurs who faced a sudden capital 
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shortage had to de-lever their previous high leveraging positions. News media revealed that 
investment banks and hedge funds such as Deutsche Bank, Merrill Lynch, and Citadel, among 
others, have lost billions of dollars due to the basis trade in the crisis period. As shown in Figure 
2, the basis of investment grade index in late 2008 is about -250 bps whereas that of the 
speculative grade index is about -400 bps in our sample. On the other hand, the potential cash-
rich investors (or “smart-money”) are reluctant to step in to bring the price back to its 
fundamental value due to fear or uncertainty (e.g., Duffie, 2010). The joint effects of forced-
deleveraging by the financial-constrained arbitrageurs and a lack of investment capital 
significantly delay the price discovery and therefore the price deviation stays significantly longer 
than usual. Taking the view of Gabaix, Krishnamurthy and Vigneron (2007), according to the 
limits of arbitrage theory, the marginal investor in a particular asset market is an investor who 
specializes in that market. Hence, forced liquidations by arbitrageurs can change the marginal 
investors in the credit markets back to the conventional buy-and-hold bond investors and those 
investors who purchase CDS for insuring the credit risk. Hence, our third empirical hypothesis 
proposes the role of CDS during the crisis, 
Hypothesis 3: CDS does not help to reduce price divergence between corporate bond 
and CDS markets due to the lack of the basis arbitrage during the crisis. 
Similar to before, we split the Hypothesis 3 into two sub-hypotheses for the corporate bond 
and CDS markets separately. 
Hypothesis 3a: CDS does not help to reduce price divergence in corporate bond due 
to the lack of the basis arbitrage during the crisis. 
Hypothesis 3b: CDS does not help to reduce price divergence in CDS market due to 
the lack of the basis arbitrage during the crisis. 
As we have shown that CDS-bond basis arbitrage is very likely to help improve the price 
convergence in investment grade bonds and CDS spreads in the normal period in the previous 
section, we want to verify whether there is plausibly a lack of the basis arbitrage since there 
exists significant price divergence between the two credit markets during the crisis as shown in 
Figure 2 as well as in the literature.  
First, we show how the past basis is related to the future return of bond portfolios. Second, 
we test the relationship at the individual bond level. Lastly, we examine how the past basis is 
related to future movement in CDS spreads.  
29 
 
4.1. The CDS-Bond Basis and the Future Returns of Bond Portfolios 
We form five basis portfolios for investment grade bonds and speculative grade bonds 
respectively and report the holding period returns from 2007 to 2008 based on the average level 
of basis in past 60 days. Table 7 panel A reports both the raw returns and the excess returns of 
the portfolios. We observe that the basis level for investment grade bonds is much more negative 
in the crisis than that in the normal period. For example, the 1st quintile portfolio has a basis level 
of -96 bps, about 34 bps lower than before. The 5th quintile portfolio has a basis level of 2 bps, 
about 10 bps lower than before. Similar results are also found in speculative grade bonds. The 1st 
quintile portfolio has a basis level of -163 bps, whereas it is used to be at -70 bps in the normal 
period. The 5th quintile portfolio has a basis level of 276 bps, about 252 bps lower than that in the 
normal period.  
Panel A shows that the negative past basis is related to negative future excess returns in the 
investment grade bond portfolios in 11 of the 12 cases whereas positive past basis is also related 
to negative future excess returns. For instance, the 1st quintile (with the lowest basis level) 
investment grade basis portfolio has a future excess return of -5.9% and the 5th one (with the 
highest basis level) has a future excess return of -1.6%. If investors buy the portfolio with the 
lowest basis and short the portfolio with the highest basis, they earn a return of -4.4% per year. 
These results indicate that there is significant price divergence in an average investment grade 
bond portfolio given that its past basis is much more negative than in the normal period. It is 
very unlikely that investors can engage in profitable negative basis arbitrage given that fact that a 
significant negative return can arise from the bond side even if CDS spread does not move. A 
further concern is that investment grade CDS spread on average continues to widen even more in 
the crisis on average as we will show later. 
Similar results are found in speculative grade bond portfolios with negative basis. Negative 
past basis is related to negative future returns, indicating that speculative grade bond portfolios 
continue to experience price divergence if past basis is significantly negative. If speculative 
grade bond portfolios have positive basis in the past, they generate negative future returns. The 
1st quintile speculative grade basis portfolio has a future return of -13.4% and the 5th one has a 
future return of -25.5% on average. This indicates that if basis arbitrageurs can engage in 
positive basis arbitrage by selling the speculative grade bonds, they can earn positive returns 
from the price convergence of the speculative grade bonds. However, it is very unlikely to 
30 
 
happen during the crisis as there is more supply than demand for speculative grade bonds due to 
a flight to quality observed in the crisis (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2012). Moreover, even there 
exists attractive arbitrage opportunities for speculative grade bonds with positive basis, investors 
may be reluctant to engage in the basis trade if the change of CDS spreads is volatile and 
unpredictable in the crisis as we will show later.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Next, we also test whether the negative returns found in most of the bond portfolios can be 
explained by conventional systematic risk factors. Panel B shows the regression result of 
equation (7) for value-weighted 20-day holding returns. Unlike before, only one of the five 
intercepts for investment grade portfolios is significantly different from zero at 10% significance 
level. This indicates that there is no additional risk beyond traditional risk factors for the return 
of an average investment grade bond portfolio. This again, suggests that it is likely that there is a 
lack of basis arbitrage for investment grade bonds during the crisis. If arbitrage is still at force, 
we would expect the abnormal returns are significant since all the new arbitrage risks heightened 
significantly during the crisis. 
On the contrary, the intercepts for speculative grade portfolios are significantly negative for 
four out of five quintile portfolios. These results indicate that there are significantly downward 
mis-pricings in the speculative grade bonds during the crisis, consistent with the anecdotal 
evidence that there is significant high selling pressure for high risky bonds from bond investors. 
Moreover, Mitchell and Pulvino (2012) also show that rehypothecation lenders—necessary 
financial intermediaries that provide funding for arbitrage—are more reluctant to accept relative 
illiquid high-yield bonds as collateral during the crisis.   
Panel C and D report largely similar results for 40-day and 60-day holding horizons. The 
intercepts for investment grade bond portfolios are more negative than the 20-day results for 
those portfolios with negative basis and the intercepts are slightly more significantly different 
from zero compared to the results in the 20-day horizon. These results indicate that the price 
divergence in investment grade bonds cannot be fully explained by the conventional risk factors, 
but the explanatory power of the conventional systematic risk factors is still better than that in 
the normal period. As for speculative grade bonds, the results are largely similar across all time 
horizons. The intercepts for almost all speculative grade bond portfolios are significantly 
negative at a 1% significance level, indicating the selling pressure is very strong in the crisis. 
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In sum, our results show that there is a lack of negative basis arbitrage because both 
investment grade and speculative grade bonds with negative basis experience price divergence 
across three different time horizons. The bond portfolios with positive basis are unlikely to be 
engaged in the basis arbitrage because the profits can only be realized if there are enough buying 
interests for speculative grade bonds during the crisis and there are no widening of CDS spreads. 
Further evidence reveals that almost all the speculative grade bonds have experienced abnormal 
negative returns, indicating there are significant downward mis-pricings for speculative grade 
bonds. Moreover, we will show later that CDS spread market becomes much more unpredictable 
in the crisis. Hence, it is very unlikely that positive basis arbitrage becomes popular during the 
crisis. Given the reduction of negative basis arbitrage and implausible positive arbitrage, we find 
evidence in support for the Hypothesis 3a at the bond portfolio level. 
 
4.2. The CDS-Bond Basis and the Future Returns of Individual Bonds 
Here, we test whether CDS helps to reduce price divergence in investment grade bonds 
through the basis arbitrage. Table 8 reports the summary statistics and the regression results of 
the equation (8). 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Panel A in Table 8 shows that the average basis level for individual investment grade bonds 
during the crisis is at -61 bps, about 38 bps lower than that of the normal period. Other bond 
characteristics, such as ratings, maturity, age, coupon, issue size, duration, and convexity are 
largely similar to those in the normal period shown in panel B in Table 3.  
Model 1 in panel B of Table 8 shows that past basis is significantly negatively related to the 
future investment grade bond returns. In terms of economic magnitude, one standard deviation 
increase in basis can generate an annual return of about -10 bps in the future. The prediction is 
similar to what we find in the normal period and predicts price convergence in the bonds. 
However, after we include past CDS spread, the change of CDS spread, and past bond returns as 
control variables in Model 2 to Model 4, we find that these control variables move returns on the 
opposite directions to what the basis does to future bond returns. For example, Model 2 shows 
that the coefficients of the past CDS spread are all statistically significantly negative in all three 
time horizons. This implies that investment grade bonds are strongly led by past CDS spreads 
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during the crisis, and the bond price can still diverge away from the CDS spread if the past basis 
is negative. In economic magnitude, one standard deviation increase in past CDS spread predicts 
a return -74 bps on average. Hence, if the past basis is negative, CDS spread is lower than the 
credit spread. Such prediction would imply that credit spread will increase more, causing a larger 
mis-pricing between CDS and bond spreads. More interestingly, the past CDS spread dominates 
in economic significance than the past basis in predicting future bond returns. Similar results are 
also observed in Model 3 as the past change of CDS spread also leads to further divergence of 
the bonds. One standard deviation increase in past CDS change predicts a return of -19 bps on 
average. The combined impact of past basis, past CDS spread, and past CDS spread change leads 
to price divergence in investment grade bonds if the past basis is negative. Model 4 also shows 
that the predictability of basis is further reduced by 25%-35% once the past bond returns are 
included. Hence, all these results suggest that although the basis arbitrage can lead to price 
convergence in theory, but in reality, the investment grade bonds experienced further divergence 
due to the strong spillover effect of the CDS market and the strong reversals in the bond returns 
in the crisis.  
These results show that CDS has two roles to play in the credit markets, including providing 
hedging benefits for credit risk and providing trading opportunities to reduce market mis-pricings. 
During the crisis, the first role seems to be more dominating than the second role. This result is 
plausibly due to the lack of basis arbitrage during the crisis due to the market frictions such as 
the limits of arbitrage. The marginal investors of investment grade bonds are likely becoming 
conventional buy-and-hold investors again in the crisis rather than the basis arbitrageurs in the 
normal period.  
Panel C and D in Table 8 present the results for speculative grade bonds. We also find that 
the basis level is more negative for speculative grade bonds in the crisis. Panel D shows that 
although the past basis has significant prediction power for future bond returns, the predictability 
disappears once the past CDS spread and past bond returns are controlled for in Model 4.   
In sum, our results show that although the past basis predicts negative future bond returns, 
such predictability reduces for investment grade bonds and disappears for speculative grade 
bonds once we control for past CDS spread and past bond returns. More importantly, the net 
effect on the investment grade bond returns if the past basis is negative is that the bond prices 
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would diverge further from the CDS spread. This result shows that CDS market provides more of 
the hedging benefits rather than providing better price discovery through arbitrage during the 
crisis. This finding is also consistent with Coudert and Gex (2010) that shows that CDS market 
leads bond market much more in the crisis than in the normal period. Moreover, the economic 
insignificance of the basis arbitrage in affecting bond returns are likely due to the fact that the 
usual arbitrageurs are greatly affected by market frictions such as the limits of arbitrage. Hence, 
we find supporting evidence for Hypothesis 3a at both the portfolio and individual bond levels. 
     
4.3. The CDS-Bond Basis and the Future Change of CDS Spreads  
Alexopoulou, Andersson and Georgesu (2009) find that during the recent financial crisis, the 
CDS market reacts more towards systematic risk whereas the corporate bond market reacts more 
to liquidity and idiosyncratic risk. Hence, we examine whether the predictability of the basis for 
CDS spread changes during the crisis is significantly different from that in normal period. We re-
estimate equation (9) here for the crisis period and Table 9 reports the results.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Panel A in Table 9 shows the summary statistics of investment grade CDS and other firm 
characteristics. The CDS spreads tend to increase more significantly during the crisis, unlike in 
the normal period when they usually decline. Basis level is more negative during the crisis period 
at -61 bps. Stock return is also more negative, with higher volatility. Leverage increases more 
and size increases less in the crisis period compared to the normal period. Profitability of the 
firm reduces more and the cash ratio increases more during the crisis period.  
Panel B in Table 9 shows that the basis no longer predicts the change of investment grade 
CDS spreads in the future as in normal period. After we include past CDS, we find that the sign 
of the coefficient of the basis even turns into positive, rather than negative as before. This result 
indicates that the past basis level predicts price divergence in CDS spread in the crisis. The signs 
of the coefficients of past CDS spread and the change of CDS spreads are sometimes 
significantly negative, implying some mean-reversion of the CDS spread during the crisis.    
Panel C shows the summary statistics of the speculative grade CDS spreads and firm 
characteristics. Similar trends are found in these firms as those with investment grade. During the 
crisis, CDS spreads increase more, basis becomes more negative, stock returns is more negative, 
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stock volatility is higher, leverage is higher, size reduces, and cash ratio is higher than the normal 
period. Panel D shows that past basis cannot predict the future change of CDS spreads at all 
model specifications. Even after the inclusion of past CDS spread, past change of CDS spread, 
and past bond returns, basis has no predictability power for the change of speculative grade CDS 
spreads. Hence, we find supporting evidence for Hypothesis 3b. 
In summary, the basis arbitrage does not help to reduce the price divergence in either the bond 
market or the CDS market during the financial crisis. Furthermore, there is some new evidence 
that the past basis leads to price divergence for investment grade CDS spreads. Hence, the 
beneficial role of CDS through arbitrage activities does not play out in the credit markets during 
the recent financial crisis. Moreover, we find that CDS market leads the bond market more 
strongly during the crisis than the normal period. The net impact of CDS predicts price 
divergence for the two credit markets as the hedging role becomes more significant whereas 
arbitraging activities decline. All these findings suggest that the net pricing impact of CDS is 
highly dependent on the prevailing trading activities in different market conditions. Our study is 
among the first to provide novel empirical evidence from the CDS market.    
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis on the economic impact of CDS on both 
the corporate bond and CDS markets since its inception. The initial introduction of CDS helps to 
improve the trading activities of speculative grade bonds with high credit risk. This benefit is 
consistent with the insurance role provided by CDS for credit risk. Moreover, we show that CDS 
improves the price convergence between the bond market and CDS market, especially for those 
credit securities with investment grade. This is due to the possibility that CDS can be used to 
arbitrage away any mis-pricing of the credit risk through a popular trading strategy—CDS-bond 
basis arbitrage. The arbitrage works quite well in the normal market conditions. However, in the 
recent crisis, the arbitrage benefits of CDS are adversely affected by the limits of arbitrage. The 
lack of arbitrage limits the CDS’s role of reducing price divergence between the two markets. 
Interestingly, we still find that CDS market leads the bond market in pricing credit risk. 
Our study is among the first that analyze the impact of CDS to the credit markets from a time 
series dimension. Our study provides robust empirical evidence for the theoretical benefits and 
costs of the CDS proposed in the literature. While some regulators propose for the suspension of 
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the CDS trading completely, our study suggests that the right focus might be to improve the 
market efficiency or reduce market imperfection in relation to trading activities. Many of the 
recent regulations such as Basel III, Frank-Douglas Act, and the proposal to set up the 
centralized clearing house for CDS trading are moving toward the right direction to reduce 
market frictions such as arbitrage risks. 
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Table 1. Liquidity in Corporate Bond Market from 1994 to 2008 
 
The table reports the monthly bond-level liquidity in corporate bond market from January 1994 
to December 2008. The bond data is from NAIC, TRACE and FISD. Panel A reports the 
summary statistics for bond-level liquidity measures and bond characteristics. Zero Trade is the 
number of zero-trade for each bond in each month. 1/Volume is the inverse of the logarithmic of 
trading volume for each bond within each month. 1/Trades is the inverse of the number of 
transactions for each bond within each month. 1/Turnover is the inverse of the turnover. Trade 
Size is the monthly average size of each transaction. Amihud is the Amihud (2002) liquidity risk 
measure for each bond to capture the price impact relative to the volume. Ratings are the discrete 
measure of ratings from S&P (for example, AAA is coded as 1, AA+ is coded as 2, and et al.). 
We use the S&P ratings whenever available, followed by Moody’s (Aaa to Baa3) and Fitch’s 
ratings. Maturity is denominated in years. Coupon is in percentage terms. Issue size is the natural 
logarithm of issuance amount in billions. Duration and Convexity are computed duration and 
convexity for each bond in each month. Panel B reports the regression results of the six liquidity 
measures on the various control variables. Dummy99 is the dummy variable that equals to 1 since 
January 1999 when CDS is first introduced. Dummy07 is the dummy variable that equals to 1 
since September 2007 when Lehman collapsed. Dummy03 is the dummy variable that equals to 1 
since May 2003 when TRACE started to include most of the investment grade bonds. IG is the 
dummy variable that equals to 1 if the bond is an investment grade bond. HY is the dummy 
variable that equals to 1 if the bond is a speculative grade bond. All the six bond-level liquidity 
measures are normalized for easy comparisons. The regression in Panel B is clustered by each 
bond and robust standard errors are reported. Panel C reports the regression results of the six 
liquidity measures on the various control variables when CDS introduction is measured on the 
bond level. DummyCDS is the dummy variable that equals to 1 when CDS is first introduced as 
proxied by the first month when the related 5-year CDS spread is reported in the Markit. An ***, 
**, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 
Name N MEAN STD MIN MAX MED SKEW KURT
Zero Trade 195,952   0.7355 0.3108 -0.05 0.96 0.90 -1.35 0.33
1/Volume 195,952   0.0689 0.0108 0.05 0.14 0.07 1.30 2.21
1/Trades 195,952   0.4390 0.3962 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.45 -1.42
1/Turnover 195,952   0.5005 1.7606 0.00 25.00 0.06 7.60 72.46
Trade Size 195,952   6.1591 5.5089 0.00 18.13 4.87 0.49 -1.25
Amihud 195,952   0.2839 0.7920 0.00 8.77 0.02 5.38 35.92
Ratings 195,952   6.7468 3.0641 1.00 25.00 6.00 1.20 3.70
Maturity 195,952   7.9967 8.9332 1.00 100.00 5.00 4.49 34.39
Coupon 195,952   6.9077 1.4321 0.00 18.00 6.88 -0.27 1.21
Issue Size 195,952   12.2488 1.0791 5.30 16.52 12.32 -0.91 2.73
Duration 195,708   5.0000 3.1611 0.91 18.22 4.20 0.92 0.10
Convexity 195,708   46.4049 63.1528 0.66 615.66 20.36 2.31 6.13  
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Panel B: Individual Bond Monthly Liquidity Measures Pre- and Post-1998 
 
Independent Variables Zero Trade 1/Volume 1/Trades 1/Turnover Trade Size Amihud
Dummy99 * IG 0.0895*** 0.2112*** -0.0653*** 0.0969*** -0.0957*** 0.1846***
[12.80] [21.10] [-7.20] [13.33] [-10.80] [29.24]
Dummy99 * HY -0.2965*** 0.0885*** -0.3214*** 0.1622*** -0.3859*** 0.1392***
[-9.28] [2.70] [-10.04] [6.85] [-12.31] [5.57]
Dummy07 * IG -0.0742*** 0.0685*** -0.0876*** 0.0610*** -0.0945*** 0.3730***
[-3.52] [3.75] [-8.99] [4.35] [-10.16] [19.01]
Dummy07 * HY -0.1561*** 0.1130** -0.1701*** 0.0527 -0.1790*** 0.8252***
[-2.74] [2.28] [-6.27] [1.49] [-7.14] [9.83]
Dummy03 * IG -0.9708*** 0.2043*** -1.0218*** 0.0892*** -1.0910*** 0.5427***
[-54.80] [12.33] [-83.08] [6.56] [-93.20] [45.17]
Dummy03 * HY -1.1364*** -0.0343 -1.0310*** -0.0921*** -1.0715*** 0.6195***
[-22.39] [-0.84] [-30.23] [-4.00] [-32.29] [13.65]
Ratings 0.0398*** 0.0041 0.0181*** -0.0095*** 0.0208*** 0.0094***
[10.59] [1.22] [8.23] [-3.93] [9.79] [3.40]
Maturity 0.0013 0.0013 0.0037*** 0.0007 0.0040*** 0.0050**
[0.60] [0.57] [2.62] [0.31] [3.00] [2.05]
Coupon 0.1962*** 0.2327*** 0.1140*** 0.0532*** 0.1011*** 0.1055***
[29.65] [41.00] [31.23] [13.23] [29.28] [26.87]
Issue Size -0.1147*** -0.1607*** -0.0326*** -0.0356*** -0.0223*** -0.1215***
[-28.24] [-42.71] [-13.45] [-13.52] [-9.58] [-41.20]
Duration 0.0425*** 0.0277*** -0.0026 -0.0052 -0.0049 0.0618***
[6.40] [4.16] [-0.67] [-0.94] [-1.32] [12.15]
Convexity -0.0010** -0.0015*** -0.0001 0.0010*** 0.0001 -0.0016***
[-2.13] [-3.53] [-0.46] [2.97] [0.31] [-3.68]
N 195,708 195,708 195,708 195,708 195,708 195,708
R2 0.46 0.15 0.38 0.01 0.42 0.19
Dependent Variables
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Panel C: Individual Bond Monthly Liquidity Measures Pre- and Post-CDS 
 
Independent Variables Zero Trade 1/Volume 1/Trades 1/Turnover Trade Size Amihud
DummyCDS * IG -0.0220*** 0.0699*** -0.1495*** 0.1390*** -0.1628*** 0.0916***
[-3.24] [8.62] [-27.43] [12.57] [-32.35] [9.54]
DummyCDS * HY -0.7265*** -0.4170*** -0.2948*** 0.0273 -0.2884*** 0.1012***
[-36.89] [-21.54] [-20.92] [1.30] [-22.11] [3.08]
Dummy07 * IG -0.0767*** 0.0674*** -0.0890*** 0.0611*** -0.0960*** 0.3725***
[-8.40] [6.81] [-15.70] [5.56] [-18.42] [26.90]
Dummy07 * HY -0.1088*** 0.1394*** -0.1496*** 0.0501** -0.1586*** 0.8198***
[-4.60] [5.60] [-9.99] [2.00] [-11.91] [16.01]
Dummy03 * IG -0.9175*** 0.2889*** -1.0158*** 0.1039*** -1.0952*** 0.6103***
[-207.37] [49.45] [-232.72] [15.84] [-264.97] [100.79]
Dummy03 * HY -1.1695*** 0.1067*** -1.1823*** 0.0057 -1.2681*** 0.6360***
[-88.44] [7.02] [-99.81] [0.40] [-113.50] [30.75]
Ratings 0.0352*** 0.0044*** 0.0140*** -0.0080*** 0.0158*** 0.0096***
[48.92] [4.68] [17.90] [-7.75] [20.87] [9.64]
Maturity 0.0019*** 0.0013* 0.0038*** 0.0008 0.0041*** 0.0044***
[4.23] [1.94] [7.44] [0.92] [8.06] [4.11]
Coupon 0.1958*** 0.2287*** 0.1176*** 0.0497*** 0.1054*** 0.1023***
[152.30] [140.22] [97.62] [28.37] [92.04] [59.94]
Issue Size -0.1087*** -0.1479*** -0.0366*** -0.0293*** -0.0280*** -0.1102***
[-135.55] [-148.97] [-47.70] [-26.69] [-38.16] [-99.43]
Duration 0.0406*** 0.0200*** 0.0002 -0.0086*** -0.0008 0.0545***
[26.86] [9.84] [0.12] [-3.48] [-0.52] [26.99]
Convexity -0.0010*** -0.0012*** -0.0002 0.0010*** -0.0000 -0.0013***
[-9.41] [-8.98] [-1.53] [6.51] [-0.01] [-6.90]
N 195,708 195,708 195,708 195,708 195,708 195,708
R2 0.47 0.14 0.38 0.01 0.42 0.19
Dependent Variables
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Table 2. Systematic Risk in Corporate Bonds for Pre- and Post-CDS Periods  
 
The table reports the asset pricing tests for both investment and speculative grade bonds before 
and after CDS is introduced. The sample period is from January 2001 to December 2006. The 
bond data is constructed from NAIC, TRACE and FISD. Panel A reports the number of bonds in 
the sample. IG represents investment grade bonds and HY represents speculative grade bonds. 
Pre-CDS represents the bonds without CDS and Post-CDS represents the bonds with CDS. Panel 
B reports the summary statistics of systematic risk factors computed for a time horizon k, where 
k=20, 40 and 60 days. The systematic risk factors include MKT_k, SMB_k, HML_k, TERM_k, 
DEF_k, LIQ_k, and AMH_k. MKT_k is the cumulative excess daily market return from day t-k 
to t (from Kenneth French’s website). SMB_k and HML_k are defined similarly. TERM_k is the 
difference between the daily return of the Barclays long-term government bond index from 
Datastream and the daily T-bill return (from Kenneth French’s website). DEF_k is the daily 
difference between the return of the Barclays long-term corporate bond index and that of the 
Barclays long-term government bond index from Datastream. LIQ_k is the sum of the turnover 
defined as the total trading volume divided by the total number outstanding for all corporate 
bonds from day t-k to t. AMH_k is the Amihud (2002) bond market liquidity risk factor, in 
which k is the time horizon used to calculate the price impact relative to the volume. We 
demeaned all risk factors. Panel C reports the beta loadings of the excess returns of the equally-
weighted and value-weighted bond portfolios constructed for the same time horizon k. The 
standard errors are Newey-West standard errors. An ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Sample Descriptions 
 
Pre-CDS Post-CDS All Pre-CDS Post-CDS All Pre-CDS Post-CDS All
2001 IG 169 74 243 361 202 563 1,521 971 2,492
HY 50 11 61 86 21 107 652 160 812
2002 IG 102 128 230 186 358 544 1,562 2,878 4,440
HY 43 26 69 71 69 140 1,044 1,509 2,553
2003 IG 74 172 246 148 493 641 4,291 21,720 26,011
HY 44 40 84 72 109 181 951 2,194 3,145
2004 IG 55 206 261 109 621 730 3,287 31,834 35,121
HY 29 55 84 50 134 184 1,205 5,003 6,208
2005 IG 37 228 265 75 665 740 3,431 47,792 51,223
HY 22 71 93 46 194 240 4,113 19,862 23,975
2006 IG 21 223 244 42 654 696 2,263 48,191 50,454
HY 14 88 102 31 204 235 3,326 21,703 25,029
Total 660 1,322 1,982 1,277 3,724 5,001 27,646 203,817 231,463
Year IG/HY The Number of Firms The Number of Bonds The Number of Bond Transactions
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Panel B: Summary Statistics of Systematic Risk Factors 
 
N MEAN STD MIN MAX
MKT_20 1703 0.43 4.25 -20.21 16.61
SMB_20 1703 0.15 2.24 -8.51 6.08
HML_20 1703 0.21 2.44 -9.38 12.47
DEF_20 1703 0.34 1.21 -4.12 4.88
TERM_20 1703 0.01 2.52 -9.27 7.43
LIQ_20 1703 0.06 0.72 -1.34 1.65
AMH_20 1663 0.09 0.59 -3.03 3.67
MKT_40 1683 0.88 6.07 -23.63 19.65
SMB_40 1683 0.31 3.09 -9.18 7.64
HML_40 1683 0.40 3.68 -10.28 19.23
DEF_40 1683 0.66 1.73 -6.52 8.19
TERM_40 1683 0.16 3.84 -12.63 10.02
LIQ_40 1683 0.05 0.68 -1.16 1.49
AMH_40 1603 0.11 0.66 -4.03 2.38
MKT_60 1663 1.28 7.01 -27.84 20.73
SMB_60 1663 0.45 3.76 -9.58 11.29
HML_60 1663 0.52 4.22 -9.60 21.91
DEF_60 1663 0.99 2.07 -7.34 8.38
TERM_60 1663 0.35 4.70 -12.20 11.53
LIQ_60 1663 0.05 0.67 -1.08 1.46
AMH_60 1543 0.13 0.70 -2.73 2.07  
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Panel C: Beta Loadings of Corporate Bond Portfolios 
EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW
Intercept 0.2448*** 0.2687*** 0.1837*** 0.1799*** 0.3760*** 0.4014*** 0.3316*** 0.3287*** 0.4299*** 0.4969*** 0.3855*** 0.3876***
[7.53] [7.38] [6.38] [6.05] [9.10] [8.54] [10.40] [10.27] [8.26] [8.60] [10.58] [10.30]
HY 0.2075*** 0.1811*** 0.3027*** 0.3201*** 0.2188*** 0.2031** 0.4124*** 0.4313*** 0.3211*** 0.2657** 0.6389*** 0.6630**
[3.26] [2.64] [5.42] [5.53] [2.66] [2.24] [5.48] [5.56] [3.27] [2.50] [7.18] [7.30]
MKT_k 0.0222** 0.0297*** 0.0396*** 0.0421*** 0.0793*** 0.0879*** 0.0607*** 0.0641*** 0.0888*** 0.1064*** 0.0585*** 0.0629***
[2.20] [2.69] [3.82] [4.12] [6.70] [6.60] [6.04] [6.52] [7.01] [7.54] [5.66] [6.03]
SMB_k 0.0635*** 0.066*** 0.0085 0.0119 0.0052 -0.0026 0.0078 0.0043 -0.0079 -0.0226 0.0289* 0.0249
[3.56] [3.29] [0.57] [0.78] [0.28] [-0.13] [0.54] [0.32] [-0.44] [-1.14] [1.87] [1.59]
HML_k -0.0103 -0.0062 0.0106 0.0032 -0.0516*** -0.0590*** 0.0301* 0.0213 -0.0326* -0.0425** 0.0313** 0.0270*
[-0.50] [-0.28] [0.56] [0.17] [-2.63] [-2.78] [1.83] [1.25] [-1.85] [-2.21] [2.05] [1.65]
DEF_k 0.0097** 0.0078* 0.0044 0.0053* 0.0139*** 0.0158*** 0.0089*** 0.0108*** 0.0096*** 0.0104*** 0.0113*** 0.0114***
[2.51] [1.82] [1.49] [1.84] [4.21] [4.42] [4.04] [4.87] [2.99] [3.10] [4.72] [4.71]
TERM_k 0.2982*** 0.3412*** 0.3571*** 0.3783*** 0.2986*** 0.3153*** 0.3300*** 0.3383*** 0.3380*** 0.3611*** 0.3610*** 0.3725***
[10.94] [11.57] [17.24] [17.35] [12.64] [11.56] [18.12] [17.68] [11.68] [11.57] [21.32] [20.87]
LIQ_k -0.0072*** -0.0086*** -0.0077*** -0.0079*** -0.0085*** -0.0088*** -0.0056*** -0.0058*** -0.0079*** -0.0092*** -0.0038*** -0.0041***
[-2.75] [-2.96] [-3.18] [-3.23] [-4.68] [-4.46] [-4.00] [-4.19] [-5.86] [-6.24] [-2.80] [-2.94]
AMH_k 0.1135*** 0.0878** 0.0388* 0.0208 -0.018 -0.0346 0.0097 -0.005 -0.2003*** -0.2562*** -0.0187 -0.0253
[3.34] [2.30] [1.67] [0.83] [-0.37] [-0.61] [0.29] [-0.16] [-3.08] [-3.57] [-0.50] [-0.64]
HY*MKT_k 0.051*** 0.0268 0.0701*** 0.0768*** 0.0126 -0.0066 0.0929*** 0.0883*** -0.0443* -0.0558** 0.0347 0.0356
[2.52] [1.26] [3.66] [3.90] [0.58] [-0.27] [4.81] [4.50] [-1.95] [-2.26] [1.54] [1.57]
HY*SMB_k 0.0467 0.0489 0.1073*** 0.0998*** 0.0468 0.0492 0.1092*** 0.1263*** 0.0999*** 0.097*** 0.1072*** 0.1116***
[1.40] [1.34] [3.68] [3.37] [1.45] [1.36] [3.69] [4.25] [2.98] [2.58] [3.21] [3.23]
HY*HML_k -0.008 -0.0305 0.0761** 0.0794** 0.05 0.0503 0.0782** 0.0676** 0.0334 0.0581 0.0297 0.0315
[-0.21] [-0.76] [2.19] [2.21] [1.45] [1.33] [2.52] [2.12] [1.00] [1.62] [0.96] [1.00]
HY*DEF_k 0.0049 0.0055 0.01* 0.0085 0.0149** 0.0117* 0.0043 0.0023 0.0252*** 0.0239*** -0.0002 -0.0026
[0.71] [0.74] [1.84] [1.51] [2.25] [1.66] [0.82] [0.41] [3.91] [3.53] [-0.04] [-0.41]
HY*TERM_k -0.2277*** -0.2556*** -0.2492*** -0.2683*** -0.2820*** -0.2914*** -0.1741*** -0.1825*** -0.3588*** -0.3772*** -0.0867** -0.0889**
[-4.43] [-4.51] [-6.14] [-6.37] [-5.65] [-5.25] [-4.29] [-4.33] [-7.30] [-7.39] [-2.12] [-2.10]
HY*LIQ_k 0.0007 0.0011 -0.0041 -0.0039 0.0078** 0.0077** -0.0026 -0.0026 0.0098*** 0.0105*** -0.0029 -0.0037
[0.17] [0.23] [-0.98] [-0.91] [2.33] [2.15] [-0.86] [-0.83] [3.55] [3.56] [-1.00] [-1.29]
HY*AMH_k -0.0746 -0.0143 -0.0286 -0.0227 -0.1317 -0.1137 -0.2843*** -0.2538** 0.121 0.0963 -0.4216*** -0.3957***
[-1.04] [-0.19] [-0.46] [-0.35] [-1.20] [-0.90] [-2.68] [-2.31] [1.02] [0.77] [-3.85] [-3.56]
N 2,611 2,611 2,664 2,664 2,491 2,491 2,583 2,583 2,378 2,378 2,505 2,505
R2 16.63 16.63 25.15 26.16 26.51 25.27 40.56 41.53 30.12 31.17 43.09 43.66
k=40 k=60
Pre-CDS Post-CDS Pre-CDS Post-CDS Pre-CDS Post-CDS
k=20
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Table 3. The CDS-Bond Basis and Individual Bond Characteristics in Normal Period 
 
The table reports the relation between the basis and various bond characteristics, such as rating, 
maturity, age, coupon, size, duration and convexity for both investment grade and speculative 
grade bonds during the normal period from January 2001 to December 2006. Panel A reports the 
number of firms and bonds in each year in our sample. Panel B reports summary information of 
the basis and bond characteristics. Bond ratings are categorized from 1 to 20 for all bonds (S&P 
rating AAA to CC). We use the S&P ratings whenever available, followed by Moody’s and 
Fitch’s ratings. Coupon is in percentage terms. Issue size is the natural logarithm of issuance 
amount in billions. Maturity, age and duration are all in years. Panel C reports the mean and 
standard deviation of the basis and the bond characteristics in groups, including ratings, maturity, 
age, coupon, issue size, duration and convexity. Rating group 1 to 4 are defined for investment 
grade bonds with S&P rating AAA, AA, A to BBB respectively, and for speculative grade bonds 
with rating BB, B, CCC to CC respectively. Maturity group 1 to 5 are defined for bonds with 1-3 
years, 3-5 years, 5-7 years, 7-10 years and more than 10 years to maturity respectively. Age 
groups 1 to 5 are defined for bonds that are less than 3 years, 3-5 years, 5-7 years, 7-10 years and 
more than 10 years old. Coupon is defined from 1 to 5 to represent bonds with annual coupon of 
0-5.5, 5.5-6.5, 6.5-7, 7-8 and more than 9 (in percentage terms). Issue is defined from 1 to 5 to 
represent bonds with the amount of issuance of 0-0.2, 0.2-0.3, 0.3-0.5, 0.5-0.6 and more than 0.6 
billions of dollars. Duration groups 1 to 5 are defined for bonds with duration of 0-3 years, 3-5 
years, 5-7 years, 7-10 years and more than 10 years respectively. Convexity is defined from 1 to 
5 to represent bonds with convexity of 0-10, 10-30, 30-50, 50-70 and more than 70.  
Panel A: The Number of Firms and Bonds by Year 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average
Firm 145 200 238 263 288 283 236
Bond 531 770 889 970 1,026 986 862
Firm 14 33 59 71 86 107 62
Bond 29 96 181 227 270 278 180
Investment Grade
Speculative Grade
 
Panel B: Summary Information of the Basis and Bond Characteristics 
N MEAN STD MIN MAX MED SKEW KURT
Basis 266,787 -0.23 0.51 -3.70 0.98 -0.10 -2.06 7.19
Ratings 266,787 6.73 2.24 1.00 10.00 6.00 -0.34 -0.52
Maturity 266,787 8.23 7.45 1.00 30.00 5.55 1.42 0.91
Age 266,787 5.05 3.77 0.00 47.90 4.14 1.10 1.89
Coupon 266,787 6.31 1.42 0.25 11.75 6.50 -0.44 0.25
Issue Size 266,787 12.82 0.65 8.57 14.91 12.69 0.09 1.29
Duration 266,787 5.44 3.42 0.92 15.01 4.59 0.81 -0.36
Convexity 266,787 57.32 73.04 1.32 336.54 25.69 1.67 1.66
Basis 63,125 0.73 2.16 -7.12 15.21 0.20 2.67 10.56
Rating 63,125 13.74 2.24 11.00 20.00 14.00 0.58 -0.43
Maturity 63,125 8.38 6.52 1.00 29.42 6.27 1.27 0.65
Age 63,125 5.73 3.80 0.00 47.87 5.07 1.13 2.36
Coupon 63,125 7.83 1.23 3.50 12.50 7.70 0.46 1.60
Issue Size 63,125 12.75 0.58 9.86 14.51 12.77 -0.19 0.65
Duration 63,125 5.10 2.59 0.72 12.95 4.73 0.58 -0.34
Convexity 63,125 47.02 49.73 0.79 251.86 28.42 1.58 1.81
Investment Grade
Speculative Grade
Characteristics
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Panel C: Basis and Bond Characteristics Groups 
 
MEAN STD MEAN STD
1 7,134 -0.03 0.43 31,454 0.15 1.26
Ratings 2 32,142 -0.13 0.47 24,127 0.63 1.56
3 119,498 -0.22 0.49 6,729 3.17 3.86
4 108,013 -0.29 0.53 815 5.70 4.06
1 66,640 -0.10 0.52 11,436 0.68 2.68
2 55,499 -0.12 0.48 10,917 0.47 2.14
Maturity 3 38,461 -0.20 0.46 14,318 0.63 2.11
4 47,324 -0.27 0.46 9,802 0.80 1.98
5 58,863 -0.48 0.49 16,652 0.96 1.85
1 97,582 -0.15 0.46 17,222 0.40 1.44
2 54,387 -0.20 0.48 13,885 0.39 2.18
Age 3 40,984 -0.26 0.49 9,998 0.84 2.61
4 45,123 -0.27 0.55 15,179 0.71 1.87
5 28,711 -0.47 0.59 6,841 2.10 2.80
1 61,610 0.03 0.29 1,174 0.32 0.86
2 55,837 -0.14 0.42 3,221 0.07 0.96
Coupon 3 58,785 -0.30 0.49 8,941 0.26 1.25
4 54,856 -0.40 0.54 17,490 0.44 1.48
5 35,699 -0.46 0.64 32,299 1.09 2.66
1 55,527 -0.35 0.58 15,048 0.74 2.12
2 37,527 -0.25 0.54 6,464 0.89 2.39
Issue Size 3 72,320 -0.21 0.51 18,871 0.67 2.04
4 42,361 -0.11 0.41 13,126 0.44 1.40
5 59,052 -0.24 0.44 9,616 1.08 2.92
1 77,778 -0.10 0.52 14,961 0.73 2.75
2 67,263 -0.15 0.47 19,777 0.70 2.30
Duration 3 51,556 -0.28 0.49 13,520 0.87 1.93
4 29,717 -0.33 0.52 11,082 0.94 1.29
5 40,473 -0.49 0.43 3,785 -0.32 0.69
1 72,651 -0.10 0.52 13,602 0.75 2.75
2 71,307 -0.15 0.47 19,454 0.65 2.28
Convexity 3 37,390 -0.27 0.49 11,429 0.55 1.67
4 25,727 -0.24 0.44 3,689 1.81 2.67
5 59,712 -0.47 0.48 14,951 0.67 1.32
CDS-Bond Basis
N
Speculative GradeInvestment Grade
CDS-Bond Basis
Characteristics Groups N
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Table 4. The Risk and Returns of the Quintile Basis Portfolios in Normal Period 
 
The table reports the returns and risk of the quintile basis portfolios for the investment- or 
speculative-grade bonds for the pre-crisis period. Panel A reports the average holding period 
returns (HPR) of five basis portfolios sorted on past 60-day basis. We delete trading days with 
less than five bonds traded, and our sample period is shortened to the period between July 2002 
and December 2006. The quintile portfolios are sorted from the lowest (quintile 1) to the highest 
(quintile 5) basis within investment- or speculative grade bonds. For each quintile, we compute 
the holding period returns for k = 20-, 40- and 60-day horizons. All portfolios are rebalanced 
daily and are value-weighted by market capitalization, which is calculated from the last available 
transaction price of the bond. To be included in the quintile portfolios, bonds must have more 
than 20 trades in past 60 trading days. When computing the holding period return for the basis 
portfolio, we use the starting price from the formation date t whenever available, followed by the 
latest price with a five-day window prior to the formation date. We use the end transaction price 
on day t+k (where k = 20, 40, 60 respectively) whenever available, followed by the last available 
transaction price within five day before day t+k. Bonds without the starting and ending prices are 
eliminated from the analysis. We report both raw and excess returns for three different holding 
periods. The row ‘1-5’ refers to the difference in returns between basis portfolio 1 and 5. Basis 
and returns are in percentage terms. The t-statistics are reported in square bracket. Panel B 
reports the time series regression of the basis portfolios returns on existing systematic risk factors 
for corporate bonds for holding horizon k=20. The dependent variable is the value-weighted 
HPR return of the basis quintile portfolio. The MKT, SMB, and HML are the usual stock market 
risk factors downloaded from Kenneth French’s website on the daily frequency. The TERM 
factor is difference between the daily return of the 10-year-to-maturity government bond index 
and the daily T-bill return (from Kenneth French’s website). The DEF factor is the difference 
between the daily return of the Lehman investment grade bond index return from Datastream and 
the daily 10-year-to-maturity government bond return from CRSP. LIQ is the sum of the 
turnover defined as the total trading volume divided by the total number outstanding for all 
corporate bonds from day t-k to t. AMH is the Amihud (2002) bond market liquidity risk factor 
computed from day t-k to day t. The row labeled ‘1-5’ refers to the differences of intercept and 
slope coefficients between portfolio 1 and portfolio 5. The intercept terms and adjusted R-
squared terms are in percentage terms. Panel C reports the results for the holding horizon k=40 
and panel D reports the results for the holding horizon k=60. An *** (**, *) denotes significance 
at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.  
  
50 
 
Panel A: Construction of Basis Quintile Bond Portfolios 
 
Raw Excess Raw Excess Raw Excess
1 -0.62 0.5358 0.3938 1.1537 0.8510 1.6931 1.2334
2 -0.35 0.4202 0.2559 0.8417 0.5003 1.2525 0.7331
3 -0.20 0.3077 0.1558 0.6513 0.3270 0.9975 0.4849
4 -0.05 0.3142 0.1478 0.6707 0.3335 1.0082 0.5007
5 0.12 0.2302 0.0692 0.4732 0.1330 0.6854 0.1594
Raw Excess Raw Excess Raw Excess
1 -0.70 0.2392 0.0302 0.6815 0.2540 1.2723 0.6157
2 0.01 0.4340 0.2250 0.6696 0.2421 1.2416 0.5849
3 0.49 0.8040 0.5950 1.5108 1.0833 2.5556 1.8994
4 1.40 1.4507 1.2417 3.2025 2.7751 4.2816 3.6249
5 5.28 1.8626 1.6171 2.9596 2.5321 6.1529 5.4962
Investment Grade Bonds
Rank
1 – 5
Speculative Grade Bonds
k=40 k=60
-1.5869*** -2.2781*** -4.8805***
[-5.23] [-5.44] [-10.82]
[7.49] [11.38] [14.11]
Basis k=20
Rank Basis k=20 k=40 k=60
1 – 5 0.3055*** 0.6804*** 1.0078***
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Panel B: Risk and Return of Basis Quintile Bond Portfolios for k=20 
 
Rank Intercept MKT SMB HML DEF TERM LIQ AMH
1 0.0145*** 0.0010*** -0.0015*** 0.0001 0.0017** -0.0002 -0.0002*** -0.0015*
[3.80] [2.80] [-3.05] [0.12] [2.05] [-1.65] [-3.64] [-1.89]
2 0.0133*** 0.0011*** -0.0015*** 0.0001 0.0015** -0.0002** -0.0002*** -0.0011
[4.18] [3.85] [-4.16] [0.32] [2.37] [-2.08] [-4.48] [-1.64]
3 0.0102*** 0.0006*** -0.0010*** 0.0000 0.0011* -0.0001 -0.0002*** -0.0008
[3.87] [2.59] [-2.86] [-0.03] [1.90] [-1.30] [-4.36] [-1.47]
4 0.0097*** 0.0004** -0.0007*** -0.0004 0.0008** -0.0001* -0.0002*** -0.0006
[5.25] [2.41] [-3.27] [-1.47] [2.21] [-1.79] [-5.57] [-1.64]
5 0.0089*** 0.0005*** -0.0009*** -0.0003 0.0009*** -0.0001** -0.0002*** -0.0006*
[6.20] [3.79] [-4.89] [-1.50] [3.35] [-2.21] [-6.38] [-1.76]
0.0057* 0.0005* -0.0006 0.0004 0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0009
[1.93] [1.83] [-1.42] [0.96] [1.28] [-1.11] [-1.35] [-1.53]
Rank Intercept MKT SMB HML DEF TERM LIQ AMH
1 -0.0167 0.0011* -0.0014 -0.0035*** 0.0024 -0.0004** 0.0003* -0.001
[-1.57] [1.71] [-1.41] [-3.28] [1.37] [-2.36] [1.70] [-0.89]
2 -0.0091 0.001 -0.0009 -0.0053*** 0.0049*** -0.0009*** 0.0002 0.0008
[-0.71] [1.04] [-0.69] [-3.14] [2.63] [-3.72] [0.73] [0.65]
3 0.0037 0.0012 -0.0024** -0.0061*** 0.0080*** -0.0011*** 0.0000 -0.0014
[0.25] [1.48] [-2.09] [-3.85] [3.08] [-3.60] [-0.09] [-0.86]
4 0.0300 0.0026 -0.0063** -0.0096*** 0.0088 -0.0019*** -0.0004 -0.0034
[1.02] [1.62] [-2.54] [-2.75] [1.43] [-3.26] [-0.90] [-1.13]
5 -0.0119 0.0072*** -0.0064** -0.0055 0.0032 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0238***
[-0.42] [5.22] [-2.58] [-1.62] [0.70] [-0.41] [0.93] [-3.38]
-0.0048 -0.0061*** 0.0050** 0.002 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0228***
[-0.17] [-4.26] [2.18] [0.62] [-0.20] [-0.30] [-0.32] [3.46]
1-5
Speculative Grade Bonds
1-5
Investment Grade Bonds
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Panel C: Risk and Return of Basis Quintile Bond Portfolios for k=40 
 
Rank Intercept MKT SMB HML DEF TERM LIQ AMH
1 0.0398*** 0.0000 -0.0016*** 0.0012** -0.0001 -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0107***
[7.76] [-0.01] [-3.77] [2.54] [-0.21] [-5.38] [-7.05] [-7.36]
2 0.0317*** 0.0002 -0.0015*** 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0076***
[7.86] [0.63] [-4.41] [1.56] [-0.38] [-5.01] [-8.13] [-6.46]
3 0.0247*** 0.0000 -0.0009*** 0.0007** -0.0002 -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0050***
[7.21] [0.05] [-3.32] [2.19] [-0.42] [-5.03] [-7.99] [-6.50]
4 0.0238*** -0.0002 -0.0007*** -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0039***
[9.85] [-1.10] [-2.87] [-0.6] [0.16] [-4.43] [-9.64] [-6.23]
5 0.0205*** 0.0000 -0.0008*** 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0030***
[9.99] [-0.13] [-3.88] [-0.19] [1.06] [-5.16] [-9.91] [-5.86]
0.0192*** 0.0000 -0.0007** 0.0012*** -0.0004 -0.0003*** -0.0001*** -0.0077***
[5.03] [0.06] [-2.37] [3.41] [-0.81] [-4.66] [-3.86] [-7.19]
Rank Intercept MKT SMB HML DEF TERM LIQ AMH
1 -0.0099 -0.0029*** 0.0025** -0.0045*** -0.0061*** 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0059***
[-0.66] [-3.95] [1.97] [-3.59] [-2.95] [0.91] [1.48] [-3.94]
2 -0.0089 -0.0029** 0.0041** -0.0035** -0.0038** -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0069***
[-0.63] [-2.16] [2.14] [-2.20] [-2.03] [-0.43] [1.31] [-3.71]
3 0.0266 -0.0052*** 0.0040** -0.0058*** -0.0038 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0117***
[1.55] [-4.38] [2.47] [-3.55] [-1.20] [0.63] [-0.23] [-4.52]
4 0.1141*** -0.0056*** 0.0051* -0.0060** -0.0094** 0.0011** -0.0006*** -0.0279***
[4.50] [-2.72] [1.90] [-2.11] [-2.51] [2.18] [-2.88] [-7.10]
5 -0.0237 -0.0041* 0.0043 -0.0103*** -0.001 -0.0004 0.0006 -0.0394***
[-0.59] [-1.83] [1.25] [-2.62] [-0.16] [-0.54] [1.63] [-5.52]
0.0138 0.0012 -0.0018 0.0058 -0.005 0.0006 -0.0004 0.0336***
[0.31] [0.56] [-0.56] [1.54] [-0.84] [0.90] [-0.94] [4.99]
Investment Grade Bonds
1-5
Speculative Grade Bonds
1-5
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Panel D: Risk and Return of Basis Quintile Bond Portfolios for k=60 
 
Rank Intercept MKT SMB HML DEF TERM LIQ AMH
1 0.0682*** -0.0012*** -0.0016*** 0.0008* -0.0022*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0071***
[11.42] [-3.55] [-3.62] [1.95] [-3.34] [-4.38] [-8.99] [-3.40]
2 0.0517*** -0.0010*** -0.0010*** 0.0003 -0.0016*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0047***
[11.21] [-3.83] [-2.81] [0.83] [-3.06] [-4.68] [-9.65] [-2.84]
3 0.0392*** -0.0006*** -0.0008*** 0.0002 -0.0009** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0039***
[10.61] [-2.96] [-2.87] [0.73] [-2.31] [-5.50] [-9.73] [-3.71]
4 0.0387*** -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0003 -0.0007** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0032***
[12.76] [-4.09] [-2.93] [-1.24] [-2.28] [-2.99] [-11.07] [-4.23]
5 0.0307*** -0.0002* -0.0010*** 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0026***
[12.87] [-1.87] [-5.19] [0.12] [-0.10] [-5.52] [-11.88] [-4.35]
0.0375*** -0.0009*** -0.0006* 0.0008** -0.0022*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0046***
[8.20] [-3.40] [-1.77] [2.52] [-4.26] [-2.66] [-5.59] [-2.72]
Rank Intercept MKT SMB HML DEF TERM LIQ AMH
1 0.0223 -0.0005 -0.0013 -0.0028* -0.0084*** 0.0005* 0.0000 -0.0040**
[1.52] [-0.78] [-0.93] [-1.94] [-2.92] [1.72] [-0.18] [-1.98]
2 0.0208 0.0014 -0.0037** -0.0025** -0.0051** 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0025
[1.14] [1.00] [-2.44] [-2.11] [-2.17] [1.62] [-0.34] [-0.97]
3 0.0869*** -0.0008 -0.0037*** -0.0047*** -0.0021 0.0003 -0.0004*** 0.0005
[4.81] [-0.67] [-2.95] [-3.43] [-0.72] [0.92] [-3.02] [0.13]
4 0.1855*** 0.0005 -0.0102*** -0.0124*** -0.0149*** 0.0014** -0.0008*** -0.0098
[6.15] [0.16] [-3.89] [-5.7] [-3.42] [2.46] [-3.35] [-1.50]
5 0.2333*** 0.0013 -0.0074** -0.0132*** -0.0066 -0.0017** -0.0011*** -0.0252***
[4.61] [0.50] [-2.38] [-4.35] [-1.03] [-2.11] [-3.75] [-4.54]
-0.2110*** -0.0018 0.0061** 0.0104*** -0.0019 0.0022*** 0.0011*** 0.0212***
[-4.54] [-0.79] [2.23] [3.96] [-0.31] [2.95] [4.12] [4.32]
1-5
Speculative Grade Bonds
1-5
Investment Grade Bonds
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Table 5: The Prediction Power of Basis for Future Bond Returns in Normal Period 
 
This table reports the predicting power of the CDS-Bond basis for future individual bond returns during the normal period from 2001 
to 2006. We run Fama-Macbeth regression on future individual bond returns at k-day horizon (where k =20, 40, 60) from day t 
onwards. Future return is the excess return of the holding period return for each bond by subtracting the risk-free return. In addition to 
the basis, we include the following bond characteristics: rating, maturity, age, duration, coupon, issue size, and liquidity on day t. 
Indliq_k is the sum of the turnover of the individual bond defined as the total trading volume divided by the total number outstanding 
for the bond from day t-k to t. We use the demeaned value of coupon and Indliqk. Bond ratings are numbered from 1 to 20 for bonds 
(S&P ratings from AAA to CC). The basis is in percentage terms. Maturity, age, and duration are in years. Additional control 
variables include past CDS spread on day t (Past CDS), the change of CDS from day t-k to t (∆(CDS Spread)k), and the bond return 
from day t-k to day t (Bond Returnk). Panel A reports the results for investment grade bonds. Panel B reports the results for 
speculative grade bonds. The standard errors are Newey-West standard errors. An ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively.  
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Panel A: Investment Grade Bonds 
 
k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60
Basis -0.0210*** -0.0347*** -0.0199*** -0.0449*** -0.0739 -0.0318** 0.0619 -0.0225*** -0.0476*** -0.0016 -0.0356*** -0.0121
[-4.73] [-2.91] [-4.90] [-3.30] [-1.32] [-1.99] [0.66] [-4.32] [-2.67] [-0.12] [-3.90] [-1.21]
Past CDS -0.0044 0.0675 -0.0519 0.1382 0.0023 -0.0432 0.0027 0.0039 0.0038
[-0.52] [1.04] [-1.21] [0.99] [0.44] [-0.91] [1.04] [1.17] [1.41]
∆(CDS Spread)k 1.6102 0.0275 -0.0212
[0.96] [0.79] [-0.94]
Bond Returnk -0.1173** -0.0372 -0.1047***
[-2.16] [-0.32] [-2.58]
Ratings 0.0018 -0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0096 -0.0006 -0.0243 0.0010 0.0051** 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003
[1.14] [-0.23] [-0.13] [-0.32] [-1.28] [-0.47] [-0.99] [0.43] [2.22] [0.06] [0.02] [-1.08]
Maturity 0.0028 -0.0011 0.0124 -0.0002 0.0025 0.0009 -0.0004 0.0004 0.0014 -0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0002
[1.18] [-0.98] [0.94] [-0.16] [1.05] [1.13] [-0.62] [1.28] [1.01] [-2.79] [0.38] [-1.13]
Age 0.0056 0.0067 0.0114 0.0028 -0.0112 0.0070 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0017 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001
[1.62] [0.97] [0.87] [1.02] [-0.99] [1.33] [-0.74] [-0.48] [1.53] [-0.81] [-1.00] [0.46]
Coupon -0.1573 -0.5570 0.0873 -0.5428 0.0834 0.2104 0.0115 -0.1366 -0.6498 -0.0566*** -0.1343** -0.0425*
[-0.65] [-1.36] [0.47] [-1.41] [0.49] [0.74] [0.06] [-0.63] [1.30] [-4.32] [-2.23] [-1.82]
Issue Size -0.0003 0.0522 -0.0008 0.0037** 0.0029 0.0037*** 0.0014 0.0014 0.0061** 0.0003* 0.0003 0.0005
[-0.10] [1.03] [-0.18] [2.02] [1.02] [2.72] [1.13] [0.33] [2.10] [1.91] [0.60] [0.81]
Indliqk -0.0710 0.0789 -0.0105 0.0020 0.0251*** 0.0170 0.0416** 0.0086 0.0184 0.0015 0.0040*** 0.0030
[-1.18] [0.82] [-0.60] [0.12] [2.59] [1.57] [2.04] [1.33] [0.66] [1.10] [3.02] [0.75]
Intercept -0.0474 -0.6949 -0.1104 -0.0526 -0.0421 -0.0168 0.1614 -0.0250 -0.0101 0.0014 -0.0085 0.0004
[-1.32] [-1.03] [-0.73] [-1.61] [-0.93] [-0.47] [0.85] [-0.42] [-1.53] [0.21] [-1.04] [0.04]
N 233,958 232,965 232,281 233,958 232,965 232,281 210,659 212,165 209,836 146,569 142,688 136,301
R2 0.27 0.34 0.37 0.41 0.38 0.43 0.30 0.39 0.44 0.43 0.47 0.52
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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Panel B: Speculative Grade Bonds 
 
k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60
Basis -0.0056 -0.0394 -0.0407* -0.0104 -0.0181 -0.0163 -0.0179 -0.0523 -0.0042 -0.0161** 0.0645 -0.0355
[-0.51] [-0.73] [-1.70] [-0.65] [-0.30] [-0.61] [-0.83] [-0.89] [-0.13] [-2.13] [0.78] [-1.53]
Past CDS 0.0082 -0.0066 0.0058 0.0010 0.0023 0.0425* 0.0074** 0.0012 0.0074
[1.19] [-0.56] [0.99] [0.19] [0.40] [1.72] [2.22] [0.12] [0.41]
∆(CDS Spread)k 0.0422 0.0255 -0.1153
[0.24] [0.20] [-1.51]
Bond Returnk 0.0732 0.2909 -1.2270
[0.36] [1.15] [-1.55]
Ratings 0.0272 -0.0005 -0.0071 0.0069 -0.0107 -0.0035 0.0095 0.0015 -0.0236* -0.0083 -0.0147 0.0195
[0.97] [-0.04] [-0.72] [1.16] [-0.97] [-0.39] [1.14] [0.24] [1.92] [-1.02] [-0.96] [0.67]
Maturity 0.0630 0.0041 -0.0210 -0.0090 -0.0056 -0.0133 0.0000 -0.0133 0.0055 0.0037 0.0046 -0.0425
[1.02] [0.24] [-1.02] [-1.28] [-0.56] [-0.93] [0.00] [-1.25] [0.97] [0.46] [0.60] [-1.26]
Age 0.0512 -0.0056 -0.0186 -0.0166** 0.0040 0.0025 0.0029 -0.0004 0.0152* 0.0036 0.0051 0.0000
[1.23] [-0.27] [-0.90] [-2.40] [0.29] [0.21] [0.23] [-0.06] [1.89] [0.55] [1.30] [0.01]
Coupon 6.5904 -0.1742 -0.8098 -1.5647** 0.9358 -0.6321 -0.4225 0.2501 2.5094* -0.3816 0.7305 -0.0602
[1.16] [-0.07] [-0.61] [-2.15] [0.37] [-0.41] [-0.35] [0.27] [1.86] [-1.00] [1.62] [-0.30]
Issue Size -0.1357 -0.0561 -0.0595 0.0097 0.0158 0.0702 -0.0058 0.0545 0.0036 0.0071** -0.0042 0.0012
[-0.95] [-0.96] [-1.48] [0.73] [0.99] [1.36] [-0.71] [1.13] [0.36] [2.05] [-1.18] [0.79]
Indliqk 0.8764 0.7235 -0.0076 0.0214 0.1982 -0.0869 -0.0362 -0.0576 -0.0152** -0.0090* -0.0110*** -0.0090***
[1.12] [0.99] [-0.41] [0.22] [1.25] -1.29 [-1.12] [-0.95] [-2.15] [-1.65] [-3.08] [-3.69]
Intercept 0.8355 0.8129 1.1258* -0.1298 -0.0080 -0.8059 -0.0387 -0.6528 0.0250 -0.0677 0.1892 0.1048*
[0.86] [1.22] [1.92] [-0.75] [-0.04] [-1.25] [-0.17] [-1.14] [0.16] [-0.49] [0.92] [1.68]
N 57,820 57,561 57,367 57,820 57,561 57,367 51,980 52,179 51,359 38,078 36,664 34,189
R2 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.30 0.38 0.40 0.33 0.40 0.45 0.35 0.41 0.45
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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Table 6. The CDS-Bond Basis and Future CDS Spread Change in Normal Period 
 
The table reports the predicting power of the CDS-Bond basis for future individual CDS spread changes during the normal period 
from 2001 to 2006. We run Fama-Macbeth regression on future individual CDS spread changes at k-day horizon (where k = 20, 40, 60) 
from day t onwards. Future spread change is the percentage change in CDS spreads. In addition to the basis, we consider the following 
firm characteristics: stock price, stock volatility, leverage, size, profitability, and cash ratio on day t. Stock return is the percentage 
change in stock price for the past three months, i.e. from the four months to one month prior to the month when day t belongs to. 
∆(Stock Volatility) is the change in stock volatility, defined as the standard deviation of daily stock prices for the past 60 days, for the 
past three months. ∆(leverage) is the change in market leverage, defined as the book value of debt divided by the market value of asset, 
for the past three months. ∆(size) is the change in the logarithm of the market value of asset, defined as the book value of debt plus the 
market value of equity, for the past three months. ∆(Profitability) is the change in profitability, defined as the income before the tax 
and interests divided by the market value of asset, for the past three months. ∆(Cash Ratio) is the change in the ratio of cash divided 
by the market value of asset, for the past three months. The basis is in percentage terms. Additional control variables include past CDS 
spread on day t (Past CDS), the change of CDS from day t-k to t (∆(CDS Spread)k), and the bond return from day t-k to day t (Bond 
Returnk). The standard errors are Newey-West standard errors. An ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Panel A reports the summary statistics for all investment grade bonds. Panel B reports the regression results for all 
investment grade bonds. Panel C reports the summary statistics for all speculative grade bonds. Panel D reports the regression results 
for all speculative grade bonds. 
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Panel A: Summary Statistics for the Investment Grade CDS Spread Change 
 
           N MEAN STD MIN MAX MED SKEW KURT
∆(CDS Spread)20          107,243 -0.0025 0.1809 -0.67 6.82 -0.02 5.76 102.71
∆(CDS Spread)40          107,132 -0.0045 0.2731 -0.69 9.41 -0.04 7.38 148.49
∆(CDS Spread)60          107,077 -0.0029 0.3543 -0.78 13.23 -0.05 9.41 231.10
Basis          107,243 -0.2765 0.4623 -2.70 0.70 -0.15 -1.69 4.02
Stock Return          107,243 0.0510 0.1398 -0.65 2.21 0.05 0.82 9.33
∆(Stock Volatility)          107,243 -0.0090 0.0948 -2.26 0.89 -0.01 -5.15 99.72
∆(Leverage)          107,243 -0.0024 0.0372 -0.85 0.65 0.00 -0.80 47.39
∆(Size)          107,243 0.0234 0.1351 -2.79 3.40 0.02 5.37 134.36
∆(Profitability)          107,243 0.0001 0.0168 -0.45 0.48 0.00 -0.38 233.14
∆(Cash Ratio)          107,243 -0.0001 0.0670 -1.04 1.59 0.00 4.13 121.82
Past CDS          107,243 0.4659 0.5541 0.03 15.67 0.32 6.18 65.96
Bond Return20 70,329          0.0013 0.0195 -0.29 0.41 0.00 0.79 19.89
Bond Return40 69,939          0.0029 0.0239 -0.35 0.46 0.00 0.69 11.71
Bond Return60 67,888          0.0038 0.0276 -0.24 0.43 0.00 0.72 7.98  
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Panel B: Regression Results for the Investment Grade CDS Spread Change 
 
k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60
Basis -0.0136** -0.0187* -0.0449*** -0.5889 -0.8817 -0.6452 -0.0226** -0.0426** -0.0495* 0.0249 -0.0737* -0.0866
[-2.58] [-1.85] [-2.82] [-1.02] [-0.99] [-1.01] [-2.31] [-2.42] [-1.80] [0.89] [-1.72] [-0.83]
Past CDS 2.1163 3.2740 2.2862 -0.0234** -0.0158 -0.0353 -0.0047 -0.0026 0.0091
[0.99] [0.99] [0.97] [-2.04] [-0.81] [-1.53] [-0.15] [-0.06] [0.10]
∆(CDS Spread)k -0.0025 -0.2163* -0.0884
[-0.03] [-1.85] [-0.78]
Bond Returnk 0.5555 2.8866 0.2850
[0.92] [1.31] [0.38]
Stock Return -0.0920** -0.1211*** -0.1465*** -4.1227 -6.5080 -4.7083 0.0160 -0.3534** -0.2290** 0.1891 0.2046 -0.2908
[-5.30] [-4.39] [-2.85] [-1.02] [-1.04] [-1.06] [0.18] [-2.06] [-2.55] [1.54] [1.31] [-0.93]
Δ(Stock Volatility) 0.0348 0.0675 0.3612 -1.8283 -3.0933 -1.9321 0.0397 -0.2460 0.1253 0.1961 -0.4088** 0.3497
[1.49] [1.60] [1.15] [-0.99] [-1.08] [-1.01] [1.16] [-0.93] [1.26] [1.03] [-2.01] [1.20]
Δ(Leverage) 0.0367 0.1058 0.5022 -24.4024 -38.1332 -26.5960 0.0123 -0.0002 -0.5241 0.1930 0.1933 0.0901
[0.62] [1.15] [1.60] [-1.00] [-1.01] [-1.00] [0.09] [0.00] [-1.12] [1.16] [-0.92] [0.08]
Δ(Size) -0.0320 -0.0946*** -0.1823*** -0.0118 0.0296 -0.0470 -0.0150 -0.4034* 0.0991 -0.1359 -0.1515** 0.2356
[-1.47] [-2.84] [-3.59] [-0.34] [0.24] [-0.44] [-0.44] [-1.86] [0.49] [-1.46] [-2.26] [0.62]
Δ(Profitability) -0.1068 -0.7795*** -1.0913** -0.1282 1.7925 1.0681 -0.2619 -0.3777 -0.5467 -0.8423** -0.3817 0.0430
[-0.71] [-2.74] [-2.34] [-0.55] [0.68] [0.59] [-0.41] [-0.34] [-1.58] [-2.16] [-0.66] [0.08]
Δ(Cash ratio) -0.2385* -0.2343* -0.4598** -0.0563 -0.0724 -0.1383 0.0246 -0.1390 0.2175 -0.0470 -0.2507* -0.3313***
[-1.65] [-1.65] [-2.11] [-1.12] [-0.62] [-1.17] [0.30] [-0.40] [0.69] [-0.93] [-1.86} [-3.83]
Intercept 0.0026 0.0146 0.0396 -2.4868 -3.8675 -2.6907 0.0066 -0.0313 0.0115 0.0288 -0.0462 0.0015
[0.45] [1.59] [1.48] [-0.99] [-1.00] [-0.98] [0.65] [-0.87] [0.54] [1.30] [-0.92] [0.03]
N 107,243 107,132 107,077 107,243 107,132 107,077 96,000 96,917 96,145 70,329 69,939 67,888
R2 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.07
Model 1 Model 4Model 2 Model 3
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Panel C: Summary Statistics for the Speculative Grade CDS Spread Change 
 
           N MEAN STD MIN MAX MED SKEW KURT
∆(CDS Spread)20            24,514 -0.0010 0.2384 -0.94 12.77 -0.02 19.32 899.81
∆(CDS Spread)40            24,495 -0.0017 0.3114 -1.00 13.79 -0.04 11.33 411.93
∆(CDS Spread)60            24,459 -0.0039 0.3700 -1.00 15.32 -0.06 9.50 307.40
Basis            27,566 0.5568 1.9322 -3.08 13.35 0.11 2.93 11.18
Stock Return            24,514 0.0545 0.2967 -0.89 2.81 0.04 1.79 12.53
∆(Stock Volatility)            24,514 -0.0033 0.1773 -1.81 2.18 -0.01 0.95 22.39
∆(Leverage)            24,514 0.0004 0.0645 -0.55 0.35 0.00 0.63 5.22
∆(Size)            24,514 0.0005 0.1569 -4.13 1.07 0.01 -4.21 114.90
∆(Profitability)            24,514 0.0002 0.0276 -0.20 0.35 0.00 0.77 31.25
∆(Cash Ratio)            24,514 0.0025 0.0653 -1.05 0.59 0.00 -0.69 38.43
Past CDS            24,514 4.3447 4.8952 0.30 60.16 2.78 2.91 11.20
Bond Return20            16,494 0.0062 0.0458 -0.51 0.82 0.00 0.79 19.89
Bond Return40            16,243 0.0029 0.0239 -0.35 0.46 0.00 2.46 34.33
Bond Return60            15,361 0.0141 0.0718 -0.49 0.80 0.01 1.84 15.53  
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Panel D: Regression Results for the Speculative Grade CDS Spread Change 
 
k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60
Basis -0.0167 -0.0790 -0.0786 2.9434 0.7386 -1.7195 -0.0984 1.1831 -0.0565 -0.0304 -0.2922 0.4848
[-0.55] [-1.61] [-1.00] [1.02] [1.23] [-0.80] [-1.01] [0.98] [-0.94] [-1.09] [-1.34] [1.34]
Past CDS -0.1031 -0.0938 -0.1798 -0.0095 0.1551 0.0184 0.0164 0.0473 -0.0266
[-1.13] [-1.61] [-0.96] [-0.95] [1.28] [0.50] [0.90] [1.13] [-0.68]
∆(CDS Spread)k -0.2175 1.1846 -0.4143
[-0.89] [1.18] [-1.07]
Bond Returnk -0.1408 2.7530 0.3513
[-0.47] [1.09] [0.28]
Stock Return 0.2210 -0.5150** -0.3158 -0.0891 -0.4941 -0.5985 -0.2731 1.5043 -0.4444** -0.1973 -2.2204 -0.0010
[0.82] [-2.14] [-1.38] [-0.10] [-0.70] [-0.24] [-1.40] [0.91] [-2.20] [-0.91] [-1.12] [-0.00]
Δ(Stock Volatility) 0.7444 0.6841 1.7860 -22.2020 -1.9094 25.9509 -3.0308 2.5269 0.0278 -0.0989 -0.5901** -0.0499
[1.40] [0.87] [1.14] [-1.00] [-0.38] [1.40] [-0.98] [0.77] [0.10] [-1.40] [-2.17] [-0.09]
Δ(Leverage) 12.2161 7.2030 8.8809** -26.7665 5.5364 63.1894 -0.8304 -4.9752 -0.3330 -0.1135 -2.3241 1.8236
[1.48] [0.96] [2.09] [-0.83] [0.48] [1.42] [-0.84] [-1.06] [-0.29] [-0.26] [-0.66] [1.48]
Δ(Size) 4.5292 2.6197 2.6618* 1.1188 -1.8077 -11.0814 0.1787 -2.0810 -0.7205 0.1145 0.0623 0.4376
[1.36] [0.86] [1.67] [1.03] [-0.58] [-0.90] [0.53] [-0.78] [-0.67] [0.82] [0.66] [0.89]
Δ(Profitability) -12.9344 -6.9365 -6.0259 1.0588 -1.8347 -5.1043 -0.4163 2.3731 -1.0411 -0.4447 -0.0265 -5.0475
[-1.41] [-0.83] [-1.21] [0.82] [-0.66] [-0.45] [-0.33] [1.36] [-0.71] [-0.76] [-0.05] [-1.32]
Δ(Cash ratio) -0.4205 -0.4636 -0.0219 -1.3957 -6.0664 -23.9591 -0.6837 -0.1409 -0.9003 -0.0007 0.1434*** 0.7474
[-1.21] [-1.19] [-0.05] [-1.37] [-1.05] [-1.00] [-1.18] [-0.65] [-1.23] [-0.01] [2.92] [1.25]
Intercept 0.3333 0.2340 0.2491 2.7095 1.0441 -0.1008 -0.1955 -0.3593 -0.1800 -0.0901 -0.6930 0.4986
[1.19] [0.90] [1.49] [1.02] [1.52] [-0.04] [-1.15] [-1.38] [-0.91] [-1.17] [-1.16] [1.47]
N 24,514 24,495 24,459 24,514 24,495 24,459 21,873 22,070 21,784 16,494 16,243 15,361
R2 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.15
Model 1 Model 4Model 2 Model 3
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Table 7. The Risk and Returns of the Quintile Basis Portfolios in Crisis Period 
 
The table reports the returns and risk of the quintile basis portfolios for the investment- or 
speculative-grade bonds for the crisis period from 2007 to 2008. Panel A reports the average 
holding period returns (HPR) of five basis portfolios sorted on past 60-day basis. The quintile 
portfolios are sorted from the lowest (quintile 1) to the highest (quintile 5) basis within 
investment- or speculative grade bonds. For each quintile, we compute the holding period returns 
for k = 20-, 40- and 60-day horizons. All portfolios are rebalanced daily and are value-weighted 
by market capitalization, which is calculated from the last available transaction price of the bond. 
To be included in the quintile portfolios, bonds must have more than 20 trades in past 60 trading 
days. When computing the holding period return for the basis portfolio, we use the starting price 
from the formation date t whenever available, followed by the latest price with a five-day 
window prior to the formation date. We use the end transaction price on day t+k (where k = 20, 
40, 60 respectively) whenever available, followed by the last available transaction price within 
five day before day t+k. Bonds without the starting and ending prices are eliminated from the 
analysis. We report both raw and excess returns for three different holding periods. The row ‘1-
5’ refers to the difference in returns between basis portfolio 1 and 5. Basis and returns are in 
percentage terms. The t-statistics are reported in square. Panel B reports the time series 
regression of the basis portfolios returns on existing systematic risk factors for corporate bonds. 
The MKT, SMB, and HML are the usual stock market risk factors downloaded from Kenneth 
French’s website on the daily frequency. The TERM factor is difference between the daily return 
of the 10-year-to-maturity government bond index and the daily T-bill return (from Kenneth 
French’s website). The DEF factor is the difference between the daily return of the Lehman 
investment grade bond index return from Datastream and the daily 10-year-to-maturity 
government bond return from CRSP. LIQ is the sum of the turnover defined as the total trading 
volume divided by the total number outstanding for all corporate bonds from day t-k to t. AMH 
is the Amihud (2002) bond market liquidity risk factor, in which k (= 20, 40, or 60) represents 
the number of days used to calculate the price impact relative to the volume. Panel B reports the 
results for 20-day value-weighted HPR returns. Panel C reports the results for 40-day HPR 
returns and panel D reports the results for 60-day HPR returns. The row labeled ‘1-5’ refers to 
the differences of intercept and slope coefficients between portfolio 1 and portfolio 5. The 
intercept terms and adjusted R-squared terms are in percentage terms. An *** (**, *) denotes 
significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.  
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Panel A: Construction of Basis Quintile Bond Portfolios 
 
Raw Excess Raw Excess Raw Excess
1 -0.96 -0.2744 -0.5027 -0.6467 -1.1051 -1.0951 -1.7860
2 -0.58 0.0216 -0.2066 -0.1578 -0.6162 -0.4483 -1.1392
3 -0.42 0.1023 -0.1259 -0.1426 -0.6009 -0.4469 -1.1378
4 -0.24 0.2971 0.0688 0.3397 -0.1204 0.2735 -0.4174
5 0.02 0.1360 -0.0922 0.1757 -0.2826 0.0813 -0.6095
Raw Excess Raw Excess Raw Excess
1 -1.63 -1.0767 -1.3050 -2.1326 -2.5909 -3.0813 -3.7723
2 -0.41 -0.8016 -1.0299 -1.4223 -1.8807 -1.9764 -2.6674
3 0.23 -1.1486 -1.3769 -2.2366 -2.6950 -3.2892 -3.9801
4 0.91 -1.9140 -2.1422 -3.9919 -4.4503 -5.8755 -6.5664
5 2.76 -2.4669 -2.6952 -5.6059 -6.0643 -8.6451 -9.3451
1 – 5 1.3901*** 3.4733*** 5.5727***[4.92] [10.58] [15.40]
Speculative Grade Bonds
Rank Basis k=20 k=40 k=60
1 – 5 -0.4104*** -0.8224*** -1.1764***[-4.17] [-6.94] [-9.53]
Investment Grade Bonds
Rank Basis k=20 k=40 k=60
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Panel B: Risk and Return of Basis Quintile Bond Portfolios for k=20 
 
Rank Intercept MKT SMB HML DEF TERM LIQ AMH
1 -0.0150* 0.0010*** 0.0013 -0.0061*** 0.0002 -0.0002** 0.0002 -0.0014*
[-1.75] [2.72] [1.29] [-5.80] [0.19] [-2.10] [1.08] [-1.70]
2 -0.0156 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0061*** -0.0011 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0008
[-1.49] [0.05] [0.01] [-4.75] [-0.76] [-0.74] [1.34] [-0.72]
3 -0.0116 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0051*** 0.0003 -0.0002** 0.0002 -0.0005
[-1.47] [0.60] [0.18] [-5.03] [0.25] [-2.14] [1.15] [-0.50]
4 -0.0019 -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0042*** -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0007
[-0.25] [-0.59] [0.86] [-5.30] [-0.59] [-0.64] [0.17] [-0.85]
5 -0.0130 -0.0008*** -0.0012 -0.0028*** -0.0013 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0004
[-1.42] [-2.89] [-1.03] [-2.89] [-1.27] [-0.53] [1.31] [0.42]
-0.0020 0.0018*** 0.0025** -0.0033*** 0.0015 -0.0002* 0.0000 -0.0018*
[-0.27] [5.74] [2.38] [-3.34] [1.41] [-1.76] [-0.26] [-1.92]
Rank Intercept MKT SMB HML DEF TERM LIQ AMH
1 -0.0289** 0.0005 0.0019 -0.0073*** -0.0019 0.0008** 0.0007** -0.0003
[-2.04] [0.67] [1.16] [-3.17] [-0.88] [2.40] [2.14] [-0.15]
2 -0.0201 0.0007 0.0024* -0.0062*** -0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0017
[-1.64] [1.04] [1.85] [-3.23] [-0.19] [1.58] [1.57] [0.92]
3 -0.0391** 0.0009 0.0028 -0.0084*** 0.0033 0.0003 0.0008** -0.0002
[-2.53] [0.92] [1.58] [-3.97] [1.18] [0.77] [2.28] [-0.13]
4 -0.0871*** 0.0012 0.0003 -0.0129*** 0.0065 0.0000 0.0017*** -0.003
[-3.08] [0.74] [0.09] [-2.99] [1.46] [0.02] [2.87] [-0.87]
5 -0.0803*** 0.0010 -0.0022 -0.0143*** 0.0039 0.0004 0.0015** 0.0000
[-2.75] [0.41] [-0.58] [-3.19] [0.62] [0.75] [2.46] [-0.01]
0.0515*** -0.0005 0.0041 0.0070*** -0.0058 0.0004 -0.0009** -0.0003
[2.94] [-0.25] [1.53] [2.63] [-1.18] [1.25] [-2.36] [-0.09]
Investment Grade Bonds
1-5
Speculative Grade Bonds
1-5
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Panel C: Risk and Return of Basis Quintile Bond Portfolios for k=40 
 
Rank Intercept MKT SMB HML DEF TERM LIQ AMH
1 -0.0667*** -0.0021*** -0.0026*** -0.0043*** -0.0030*** -0.0002 0.0007*** -0.0018
[-6.11] [-6.94] [-2.81] [-9.38] [-3.10] [-1.56] [5.29] [-1.08]
2 -0.0263*** -0.0029*** -0.0062*** -0.0030*** -0.0059*** 0.0001 0.0002** -0.0012
[-3.05] [-9.49] [-6.82] [-6.47] [-5.86] [0.92] [2.44] [-0.88]
3 -0.0299*** -0.0025*** -0.0047*** -0.0026*** -0.0040*** 0.0001 0.0003*** -0.0011
[-3.36] [-10.51] [-5.59] [-5.52] [-4.24] [0.74] [3.03] [-0.78]
4 -0.0038 -0.0021*** -0.0032*** -0.0024*** -0.0035*** 0.0001** 0.0000 -0.0006
[-0.50] [-8.91] [-5.16] [-5.90] [-5.32] [2.22] [0.38] [-0.49]
5 -0.0093 -0.0019*** -0.0049*** -0.0017*** -0.0027** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0008
[-1.18] [-7.83] [-4.96] [-3.12] [-2.57] [0.65] [0.75] [0.67]
-0.0574*** -0.0003 0.0023** -0.0026*** -0.0003 -0.0002* 0.0006*** -0.0026*
[-5.32] [-0.85] [2.37] [-4.71] [-0.26] [-1.89] [4.71] [-1.82]
Rank Intercept MKT SMB HML DEF TERM LIQ AMH
1 -0.0845*** -0.0016* -0.0080*** -0.0079*** -0.0019 0.0003 0.0009*** 0.0109***
[-4.89] [-1.71] [-4.86] [-5.85] [-0.77] [0.99] [4.47] [5.02]
2 -0.0678*** -0.0015** -0.0043*** -0.0077*** -0.0018 0.0003 0.0007*** 0.0101***
[-4.43] [-2.09] [-3.09] [-6.11] [-0.87] [1.12] [4.05] [5.58]
3 -0.1239*** -0.0014 -0.0048*** -0.0065*** 0.002 -0.0002 0.0012*** 0.0113***
[-7.18] [-1.54] [-2.61] [-4.52] [0.76] [-0.46] [6.15] [4.79]
4 -0.2098*** -0.0045*** -0.0138*** -0.0079*** 0.0030 0.0000 0.0021*** 0.0103***
[-9.55] [-4.10] [-4.58] [-4.49] [0.81] [0.05] [8.31] [3.21]
5 -0.2819*** -0.0037*** -0.0175*** -0.0067*** 0.0052 -0.0001 0.0028*** 0.0001
[-10.84] [-2.63] [-6.07] [-3.15] [1.17] [-0.16] [9.48] [0.04]
0.1974*** 0.0022 0.0095*** -0.0012 -0.0071* 0.0004 -0.0020*** 0.0107***
[9.55] [1.65] [4.56] [-0.96] [-1.84] [0.96] [-9.09] [2.93]
Investment Grade Bonds
1-5
Speculative Grade Bonds
1-5
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Panel D: Risk and Return of Basis Quintile Bond Portfolios for k=60 
 
Rank Intercept MKT SMB HML DEF TERM LIQ AMH
1 -0.0756*** 0.0000 -0.0058*** 0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0006*** 0.0004*** -0.0055***
[-4.12] [0.03] [-5.95] [0.96] [-0.05] [-4.06] [3.11] [-2.67]
2 -0.0287 0.0009 -0.0073*** 0.0022** 0.0013 -0.0004** 0.0001 -0.0068***
[-1.58] [1.33] [-8.23] [2.35] [0.75] [-2.24] [0.78] [-2.64]
3 -0.0376** 0.0004 -0.0062*** 0.0019* 0.0011 -0.0004** 0.0002 -0.0068***
[-2.25] [0.56] [-6.99] [1.79] [0.65] [-2.05] [1.39] [-2.79]
4 0.0087 0.0008 -0.0037*** 0.0007 0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0047**
[0.59] [1.46] [-5.16] [0.84] [0.47] [-0.77] [-1.04] [-2.54]
5 -0.0185 0.0011* -0.0048*** 0.0017** 0.0035** -0.0004** 0.0001 -0.0059***
[-1.10] [1.85] [-6.13] [2.01] [2.13] [-2.32] [0.43] [-2.82]
-0.0570*** -0.0011** -0.0010 -0.0011** -0.0036** -0.0002* 0.0004*** 0.0003
[-3.84] [-2.24] [-1.22] [-2.22] [-2.38] [-1.94] [3.48] [0.24]
Rank Intercept MKT SMB HML DEF TERM LIQ AMH
1 -0.1167*** -0.0039*** -0.0201*** -0.0003 -0.0086*** 0.0002 0.0007*** -0.0016
[-3.20] [-3.44] [-11.75] [-0.28] [-2.66] [0.69] [2.73] [-0.50]
2 -0.0826** -0.0034*** -0.0157*** -0.0007 -0.0082*** 0.0001 0.0005** 0.0031
[-2.51] [-3.21] [-9.87] [-0.69] [-2.79] [0.34] [2.12] [1.07]
3 -0.1611*** -0.0048*** -0.0177*** 0.0017 -0.0072** -0.0002 0.0010*** 0.0019
[-4.28] [-4.12] [-9.69] [1.39] [-2.13] [-0.91] [3.72] [0.63]
4 -0.3200*** -0.0074*** -0.0242*** 0.0041** -0.0013 -0.0001 0.0021*** -0.0072*
[-6.43] [-4.6] [-10.05] [2.25] [-0.26] [-0.23] [6.00] [-1.70]
5 -0.4925*** -0.0072*** -0.0302*** 0.0061*** 0.0044 -0.0007* 0.0033*** -0.0124**
[-8.63] [-3.95] [-10.7] [2.99] [0.82] [-1.81] [7.82] [-2.11]
0.3758*** 0.0033** 0.0101*** -0.0064*** -0.0129*** 0.0009*** -0.0025*** 0.0108**
[12.62] [2.42] [6.01] [-4.00] [-4.59] [3.20] [-11.67] [2.05]
1-5
Speculative Grade Bonds
1-5
Investment Grade Bonds
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Table 8. The CDS-Bond Basis and Future Individual Bond Returns in Crisis Period 
 
The table reports the predicting power of the CDS-Bond basis for future individual bond returns. We run a standard Fama-Macbeth 
regression on future individual bond returns at k-day horizon (where k = 20, 40, 60) from day t onwards. Future return is the excess 
return of the holding period return for each bond by subtracting the risk-free return. In addition to the basis, we consider the following 
bond characteristics: rating, maturity, age, duration, coupon, issue size, and liquidity on day t. Indliqk is the sum of the turnover of the 
individual bond defined as the total trading volume divided by the total number outstanding for the bond from day t-k to t. We use the 
demeaned value of coupon and Indiqk. Bond ratings are numbered from 1 to 10 for investment grade bonds (S&P ratings, AAA to 
BBB-). The basis is in percentage terms. Maturity, age, and duration are in years. Additional control variables include past CDS 
spread on day t (Past CDS), the change of CDS from day t-k to t (∆(CDS Spread)k), and the bond return from day t-k to day t (Bond 
Returnk). The standard errors are Newey-West standard errors. An ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2008. Panel A reports the summary statistics for all investment 
grade bonds. Panel B reports the regression results for all investment grade bonds. Panel C reports the summary statistics for all 
speculative grade bonds. Panel D reports the regression results for all speculative grade bonds. 
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Panel A: Summary Statistics for Investment Grade Bonds 
 
N MEAN STD MIN MAX MED SKEW KURT
Basis 109,533 -0.6070 0.7878 -3.71 0.98 -0.40 -1.38 2.03
Rating 109,533 6.9515 2.1403 1.00 10.00 7.00 -0.50 -0.32
Maturity 109,533 9.1118 7.9246 1.00 30.00 6.18 1.24 0.37
Age 109,533 5.6900 4.2682 0.00 46.76 4.80 1.08 1.35
Coupon 109,533 6.1171 1.2000 1.25 11.13 6.10 0.16 0.07
Issue Size 109,533 12.9848 0.6719 8.57 14.91 13.00 0.23 0.41
Duration 109,533 5.7772 3.4476 0.91 14.67 5.09 0.63 -0.64
Convexity 109,533 63.9065 75.6830 1.30 321.86 31.27 1.47 1.01
∆(CDS Spread)20 103,348 0.1321 0.3430 -0.79 6.76 0.06 2.42 15.07
∆(CDS Spread)40 97,527 0.2737 0.5623 -0.81 9.83 0.13 2.14 8.86
∆(CDS Spread)60 93,281 0.4185 0.7452 -0.87 14.01 0.19 2.23 10.35
Past CDS 109,533 0.8836 1.1976 0.01 29.94 0.56 6.30 78.33
Bond Return20 67,472 0.0000 0.0372 -0.52 0.80 0.00 -0.04 28.03
Bond Return40 59,633 -0.0033 0.0458 -0.60 0.86 0.00 -0.53 23.99
Bond Return60 52,510 -0.0075 0.0468 -0.61 0.78 0.00 -1.62 21.19  
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Panel B: Regression Results for Investment Grade Bonds 
 
k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60
Basis -0.0195*** -0.0206*** -0.0209*** -0.0192*** -0.0196*** -0.0181*** -0.0195*** -0.0193*** -0.0178*** -0.0153*** -0.0145*** -0.0137***
[-38.83] [-29.87] [-25.16] [-27.10] [-20.58] [-19.68] [-25.73] [-19.78] [-17.07] [-13.70] [-15.42] [-11.75]
Past CDS 0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0065*** 0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0059*** -0.0030*** -0.0079*** -0.0137***
[1.04] [-0.89] [-4.26] [1.28] [-0.77] [-3.95] [-2.62] [-6.19] [-9.16]
∆(CDS Spread)k -0.0060** -0.0074*** -0.0075***
[-2.40] [-2.85] [-3.53]
Bond Returnk -0.1969*** -0.2014*** -0.1648***
[-14.29] [-10.42] [-7.30]
Ratings -0.0023*** -0.0030*** -0.0031*** -0.0023*** -0.0029*** -0.0023*** -0.0024*** -0.0029*** -0.0024*** -0.0019*** -0.0020*** -0.0022***
[-7.31] [-5.73] [-6.18] [-5.66] [-4.71] [-4.44] [-5.94] [-5.21] [-4.59] [-4.74] [-3.97] [-4.06]
Maturity -0.0004*** -0.0008*** -0.0012*** -0.0005*** -0.0006** -0.0011*** -0.0004*** -0.0006** -0.0011*** -0.0004*** -0.0009*** -0.0011***
[-2.77] [-4.72] [-7.39] [-3.36] [-2.28] [-7.15] [-2.88] [-2.28] [-7.00] [-2.61] [-5.13] [-6.24]
Age -0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002*** -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000
[-3.93] [-0.63] [-0.51] [-2.81] [-1.52] [-0.88] [-4.42] [-1.79] [-1.08] [-1.47] [-0.72] [0.29]
Coupon -0.1263*** -0.1784*** -0.1789*** -0.1266*** -0.1447*** -0.1350*** -0.1374*** -0.1495*** -0.1189*** -0.1311*** -0.1381*** -0.1665***
[-4.77] [-6.35] [-6.28] [-5.77] [-5.07] [-5.58] [-6.45] [-5.82] [-5.02] [-4.52] [-4.38] [-5.93]
Issue Size -0.0010* -0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0010** -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0010** -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0004
[-1.92] [-1.15] [-0.26] [-2.14] [-1.03] [-0.80] [-2.11] [-1.13] [-1.02] -0.27 [-1.50] [-0.52]
Indliqk 0.0269*** 0.0198*** 0.0114** 0.0095** 0.0112*** 0.0108** 0.0101** 0.0111*** 0.0114*** 0.0343*** 0.0075* 0.0114**
[3.99] [3.47] [2.10] [2.02] [3.23] [2.58] [2.26] [3.03] [2.59] [2.91] [1.65] [2.48]
Intercept 0.0220*** 0.0323* 0.0180* 0.0215*** 0.0195** 0.0221** 0.0201*** 0.0223** 0.0266*** 0.0106 0.0257*** 0.0238**
[3.44] [1.84] [1.79] [3.89] [2.40] [2.40] [3.23] [2.36] [2.69] [1.49] [3.04] [2.15]
N 109,533 104,472 100,426 109,533 104,472 100,426 103,348 97,527 93,281 67,472 59,633 52,510
R2 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.34 0.32
Model 4Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Panel C: Summary Statistics for Speculative Grade Bonds 
 
N MEAN STD MIN MAX MED SKEW KURT
Basis 44,350 0.2646 2.4481 -7.12 15.20 0.15 1.38 7.01
Rating 44,350 14.2652 2.1284 11.00 19.00 14.00 -0.01 -1.17
Maturity 44,350 8.1004 6.0881 1.00 29.99 5.95 1.25 0.69
Age 44,350 6.4385 4.4625 0.01 48.71 5.45 1.02 1.83
Coupon 44,350 7.6019 1.2151 3.63 12.25 7.63 0.24 1.19
Issue Size 44,350 12.8300 0.6199 9.90 14.67 12.90 0.16 0.13
Duration 44,350 4.8770 2.4182 0.78 12.82 4.45 0.63 -0.18
Convexity 44,350 42.4852 44.4111 0.93 261.54 25.34 1.67 2.31
∆(CDS Spread)20 41,494 0.0898 0.2705 -0.88 3.48 0.03 2.53 15.75
∆(CDS Spread)40 39,268 0.1818 0.4295 -0.89 5.14 0.07 2.04 7.97
∆(CDS Spread)60 37,547 0.2762 0.5682 -0.90 7.88 0.13 2.17 8.39
Past CDS 44,350 6.1238 6.9241 0.06 111.32 4.32 3.35 16.95
Bond Return20 29,555 -0.0140 0.0712 -0.62 0.63 0.00 -1.89 12.66
Bond Return40 26,356 -0.0276 0.0943 -0.69 0.55 -0.01 -1.76 7.32
Bond Return60 23,388 -0.0412 0.1107 -0.69 0.57 -0.01 -1.58 5.20  
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Panel D: Regression Results for Speculative Grade Bonds 
 
k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60
Basis -0.0048*** -0.0069*** -0.0080*** -0.0057*** -0.0053*** -0.0033*** -0.0057*** -0.0052*** -0.0031** -0.0022* 0.0104 -0.0033
[-11.95] [-16.81] [-13.68] [-9.98] [-6.13] [-2.77] [-9.98] [-6.04] [-2.57] [-1.70] [0.78] [-1.35]
Past CDS 0.0009* -0.0015** -0.0044*** 0.0009* -0.0014* -0.0034*** -0.0021*** 0.0056 -0.0057*
[1.75] [-2.07] [-4.38] [1.74] [-1.94] [-3.48] [-2.72] [0.55] [-1.79]
∆(CDS Spread)k -0.0067 -0.0023 -0.0128***
[-1.18] [-0.52] [-4.29]
Bond Returnk -0.1268*** 0.4139 -0.2361*
[-3.10] [0.75] [-1.92]
Ratings -0.0011 -0.0024*** -0.0034*** -0.0010** -0.0009* -0.0002 -0.0012*** -0.0012** -0.0014* -0.0002 -0.0174 0.0008
[-1.55] [-2.88] [-3.81] [-2.39] [-1.66] [-0.33] [-2.78] [-2.18] [-1.96] [-0.38] [-1.00] [0.66]
Maturity -0.0005*** -0.0013*** -0.0021*** -0.0006*** -0.0015*** -0.0021*** -0.0006*** -0.0015*** -0.0024*** -0.0009*** -0.0020*** -0.0022***
[-2.86] [-5.04] [-6.81] [-3.35] [-5.04] [-6.32] [-3.30] [-5.31] [-6.88] [-3.63] [-4.01] [-5.64]
Age 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0007*** 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0007*** 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0006*** -0.0001 0.0044 -0.0011***
[0.09] [-1.21] [-3.83] [-0.04] [-1.56] [-3.55] [-0.23] [-1.18] [-3.20] [-0.20] [0.93] [-2.75]
Coupon 0.0639 -0.0410 -0.0938 0.0665 0.0121 0.0334 0.0439 0.0363 0.0846 0.0394 0.0998 0.2123
[0.87] [-0.60] [-1.10] [0.93] [0.19] [0.39] [0.66] [0.54] [0.89] [0.34] [1.23] [1.41]
Issue Size -0.0024 -0.0043** -0.0088*** -0.0022 -0.0035** -0.0071*** -0.0034** -0.0048*** -0.0083*** -0.0023 -0.0065*** -0.0160***
[-1.25] [-2.26] [-4.92] [-1.34] [-2.06] [-4.74] [-2.10] [-2.72] [-5.13] [-0.81] [-3.22] [-3.77]
Indliqk 0.0370* 0.0068 -0.0045 0.0348* 0.0117 0.0037 0.0291 0.0114 -0.0049 0.0509 0.0031 -0.0143
[1.84] [0.40] [-0.27] [1.96] [0.85] [0.27] [1.56] [0.88] [-0.36] [1.48] [0.20] [-0.67]
Intercept 0.0350 0.0701** 0.1352*** 0.0320 0.0489* 0.0903*** 0.0494** 0.0677** 0.1202*** 0.0317 0.2535 0.1977***
[1.23] [2.33] [4.94] [1.37] [1.96] [4.23] [2.13] [2.54] [5.02] [0.80] [1.39] [3.57]
N 44,350 42,621 41,081 44,350 42,621 41,081 41,494 39,268 37,547 29,555 26,356 23,388
R2 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.25 0.21 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.32 0.33
Model 4Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Table 9. The CDS-Bond Basis and Future CDS Spread Change in Crisis Period 
 
The table reports the predicting power of the CDS-Bond basis for future individual CDS spread changes. We run a standard Fama-
Macbeth regression on future individual CDS spread changes at k-day horizon (where k = 20, 40, 60) from day t onwards. Future 
spread change is the percentage change in CDS spreads. In addition to the basis, we consider the following firm characteristics: stock 
price, stock volatility, leverage, size, profitability, and cash ratio on day t. Stock return is the percentage change in stock price for the 
past three months, i.e. from the four months to one month prior to the month when day t belongs to. ∆(Stock Volatility) is the change 
in stock volatility, defined as the standard deviation of daily stock prices for the past 60 days, for the past three months. ∆leverage is 
the change in market leverage, defined as the book value of debt divided by the market value of asset, for the past three months. ∆(size) 
is the change in the logarithm of the market value of asset, defined as the book value of debt plus the market value of equity, for the 
past three months. ∆(Profitability) is the change in profitability, defined as the income before the tax and interests divided by the 
market value of asset, for the past three months. ∆(Cash Ratio) is the change in the ratio of cash divided by the market value of asset, 
for the past three months. The basis is in percentage terms. Additional control variables include past CDS spread on day t (Past CDS), 
the change of CDS from day t-k to t (∆(CDS Spread)k), and the bond return from day t-k to day t (Bond Returnk). The standard errors 
are Newey-West standard errors. An ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sample 
period is from January 2007 to December 2008. Panel A reports the summary statistics for all investment grade bonds. Panel B reports 
the regression results for all investment grade bonds. Panel C reports the summary statistics for all speculative grade bonds. Panel D 
reports the regression results for all speculative grade bonds. 
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Panel A: Summary Statistics for the Investment Grade CDS Spread Change 
 
           N MEAN STD MIN MAX MED SKEW KURT
∆(CDS Spread)20            50,603 0.1355 0.3469 -0.79 6.76 0.07 2.61 17.05
∆(CDS Spread)40            48,517 0.2889 0.5761 -0.81 9.83 0.16 2.50 12.83
∆(CDS Spread)60            46,721 0.4425 0.7636 -0.88 13.53 0.24 2.63 14.22
Basis            50,603 -0.6126 0.8292 -5.02 2.16 -0.41 -1.58 4.26
Stock Return            50,603 -0.0111 0.1729 -0.92 1.24 0.00 -0.41 3.03
∆(Stock Volatility)            50,603 0.0476 0.1545 -1.31 2.14 0.02 3.87 33.50
∆(Leverage)            50,603 0.0084 0.0356 -0.63 0.33 0.00 1.17 17.53
∆(Size)            50,603 0.0103 0.1265 -0.89 0.66 0.00 -0.80 5.06
∆(Profitability)            50,603 -0.0009 0.0264 -0.76 0.81 0.00 -2.20 461.02
∆(Cash Ratio)            50,603 0.0027 0.0491 -0.45 0.56 0.00 -0.15 22.85
Past CDS            50,603 0.8417 1.3331 0.03 31.20 0.48 7.39 90.64
Bond Return20 35,877 -0.0003 0.0385 -0.49 0.94 0.00 1.25 59.89
Bond Return40 33,596 -0.0045 0.0465 -0.54 1.20 0.00 0.58 50.26
Bond Return60 31,950 -0.0084 0.0466 -0.55 1.03 0.00 -1.56 32.50  
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Panel B: Regression Results for the Investment Grade CDS Spread Change 
 
k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60
Basis -0.0043 -0.0090 -0.0053 0.0044 0.0089 0.0200 -0.0931 0.0176 0.0415** 0.0291 0.6144 -0.0093
[-0.65] [-0.78] [-0.38] [0.68] [0.72] [1.27] [-1.01] [1.36] [2.17] [1.37] [0.87] [-0.24]
Past CDS -0.0571*** -0.1200*** -0.1449*** -0.0679*** -0.0783*** -0.0919** -0.0663 0.1483 -0.1854***
[-4.71] [-4.54] [-3.35] [-2.70] [-2.78] [-2.36] [-1.65] [0.70] [-2.81]
∆(CDS Spread)k -0.0609 -0.1078*** -0.0952***
[-0.62] [-2.65] [-3.24]
Bond Returnk 0.4471 -0.9312 -0.7534
[1.09] [-0.62] [-1.22]
Stock Return -0.1569*** -0.2508*** -0.3791*** -0.1953*** -0.2939*** -0.3917*** -0.1773*** -0.3168*** -0.4224*** 0.2361*** -8.3636 -0.3663*
[-3.71] [-3.58] [-4.12] [-4.35] [-4.08] [-4.26] [-4.67] [-4.68] [-4.87] [-3.22] [-1.02] [1.70]
Δ(Stock Volatility) 0.0017 0.0420 0.0814 0.0476 0.1308 0.15 0.0278 0.1253 0.1586 -0.0051 -1.4031 -0.0071
[0.03] [0.50] [0.69] [0.91] [1.51] [1.19] [0.54] [1.53] [1.31] [-0.04] [-1.05] [-0.03]
Δ(Leverage) 0.3563*** 1.1422*** 1.9288*** 0.3685*** 1.2152*** 2.1296*** 0.3592*** 1.4342*** 2.2480*** 0.5206 -30.1478 2.4569***
[2.86] [5.42] [8.10] [2.93] [5.51] [8.01] [3.03] [6.09] [7.40] [0.92] [-0.94] [3.99]
Δ(Size) 0.0162 -0.0006 0.1036 0.0313 0.0089 0.0691 0.0077 0.0164 0.0440 -0.0487 15.6915 0.0017
[0.32] [-0.01] [0.80] [0.60] [0.09] [0.54] [0.16] [0.18] [0.34] [-0.33] [1.00] [0.01]
Δ(Profitability) -0.5466*** -0.4874* 0.5501 -0.6848*** -0.7432** 0.3294 -0.6084*** -0.4435 0.6198 -2.5682* -63.3013 -0.5115
[-3.57] [-1.65] [1.14] [-4.45] [-2.45] [0.73] [-3.71] [-1.29] [1.31] [-1.91] [-1.02] [-0.23]
Δ(Cash ratio) -0.0220 -0.1023 -0.3597** -0.0293 -0.0608 -0.1525 0.0121 -0.0625 -0.1686 -0.6231 2.321 0.6985
[-0.24] [-0.74] [-2.15] [-0.31] [-0.45] [-0.96] [0.13] [-0.47] [-1.07] [-1.23] [0.97] [1.13]
Intercept 0.1173*** 0.2537*** 0.3964*** 0.1428*** 0.3019*** 0.4551*** -0.0295 0.3111*** 0.4514*** 0.1546*** 0.5345 0.4497***
[5.90] [7.18] [8.24] [6.75] [7.58] [8.44] [-0.17] [7.30] [8.55] [5.63] [1.38] [7.99]
N 50,603 48,517 46,721 50,603 48,517 46,721 47,743 45,372 43,535 35,877 33,596 31,950
R2 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.17
Model 1 Model 4Model 2 Model 3
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Panel C: Summary Statistics for the Speculative Grade CDS Spread Change 
 
           N MEAN STD MIN MAX MED SKEW KURT
∆(CDS Spread)20            14,969 0.0922 0.2662 -0.64 2.36 0.03 2.19 8.81
∆(CDS Spread)40            14,438 0.2020 0.4268 -0.62 4.53 0.09 1.99 6.41
∆(CDS Spread)60            13,940 0.3126 0.5698 -0.71 5.50 0.16 2.16 7.69
Basis            14,969 0.0485 2.0604 -10.13 12.83 0.03 0.54 6.79
Stock Return            14,969 -0.0226 0.2861 -0.89 2.57 -0.02 0.55 4.22
∆(Stock Volatility)            14,969 0.0560 0.2113 -1.22 1.91 0.03 1.49 12.70
∆(Leverage)            14,969 0.0083 0.0695 -0.32 0.38 0.00 0.57 4.41
∆(Size)            14,969 -0.0113 0.1762 -0.82 0.84 0.00 -0.65 3.93
∆(Profitability)            14,969 0.0002 0.0335 -0.27 0.26 0.00 -0.78 31.67
∆(Cash Ratio)            14,969 0.0041 0.0771 -0.56 0.39 0.00 -2.17 21.69
Past CDS            14,969 5.7205 6.7749 0.23 93.30 3.87 3.48 17.05
Bond Return20            10,951 -0.0125 0.0637 -0.56 0.95 0.00 -1.84 15.36
Bond Return40            10,447 -0.0225 0.0861 -0.71 0.50 0.00 -1.88 8.95
Bond Return60              9,917 -0.0302 0.1018 -0.76 -0.50 0.00 -1.72 6.71  
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Panel D: Regression Results for the Speculative Grade CDS Spread Change 
 
k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60 k=20 k=40 k=60
Basis -0.0040 0.0010 0.0058 -0.0047 0.0046 0.0053 -0.0074 0.0018 -0.0117 -0.0523 -0.2336 0.1056
[-1.31] [0.22] [1.03] [-1.05] [0.81] [0.65] [-1.58] [0.29] [-1.38] [-1.07] [-1.24] [0.87]
Past CDS -0.0001 -0.0045 -0.0051 0.0026 -0.0019 0.0003 0.0489 -0.0024 0.0452
[-0.03] [-1.07] [-1.04] [0.95] [-0.43] [0.06] [0.96] [-0.10] [0.62]
∆(CDS Spread)k 0.0230 -0.0681** 0.0252
[0.64] [-2.10] [0.54]
Bond Returnk 3.6913 0.0211 -1.0478
[0.90] [0.02] [-1.02]
Stock Return -0.1790*** -0.2651*** -0.2558*** -0.1679*** -0.2767*** -0.2808*** -0.1846*** -0.3324*** -0.3143*** -0.1858*** -0.0322 -0.3022***
[-7.06] [-6.59] [-5.22] [-5.88] [-5.87] [-5.08] [-5.33] [-5.12] [-4.14] [-3.87] [-0.20] [-4.38]
Δ(Stock Volatility) -0.0133 -0.0509 -0.0424 -0.0172 -0.0674* -0.0637 -0.0243 -0.0745* -0.1202* 0.0687 -0.0769 -0.1594**
[-0.65] [-1.55] [-0.86] [-0.81] [-1.88] [-1.27] [-1.05] [-1.83] [-1.94] [0.48] [-1.25] [-2.06]
Δ(Leverage) -0.0537 0.2071 0.5682*** -0.0262 0.1899 0.5200*** -0.0625 0.1301 0.3668* -0.0319 0.1668 0.2566
[-0.64] [1.41] [3.17] [-0.30] [1.21] [2.74] [-0.67] [0.68] [1.75] [-0.30] [0.96] [1.05]
Δ(Size) 0.0194 0.0807* 0.0948 0.0157 0.0937* 0.1136* 0.0308 0.1308** 0.1992*** -0.0522 0.0537 0.1973*
[0.66] [1.74] [1.49] [0.51] [1.81] [1.69] [0.91] [2.20] [2.61] [-1.60] [0.97] [1.69]
Δ(Profitability) -0.4399*** -0.8590*** -0.3509 -0.4466*** -0.8600*** -0.4674 -0.5158*** -0.9905*** -0.0007 -0.4744** -1.0600*** -0.0846
[-2.92] [-3.65] [-1.07] [-2.99] [-3.57] [-1.41] [-3.29] [-3.81] [0.00] [-2.51] [-3.73] [-0.26]
Δ(Cash ratio) -0.2898*** -0.6675*** -1.4073 -0.2778*** -0.6274*** -1.3510*** -0.2358*** -0.6693*** -1.6201*** -0.3889*** -0.7468*** -1.6997***
[-3.91] [-4.67] [-6.66] [-3.65] [-4.33] [-6.28] [-2.88] [-4.52] [-5.83] [-4.88] [-4.32] [-5.17]
Intercept 0.0925*** 0.2247*** 0.3485*** 0.0786*** 0.2240*** 0.3415*** 0.0671*** 0.2328*** 0.3357*** 0.0269 0.1417 0.2969**
[6.20] [8.40] [9.53] [4.13] [6.89] [8.77] [3.42] [6.93] [8.56] [0.37] [1.05] [2.37]
N 14,969 14,438 13,940 14,969 14,438 13,940 14,002 13,354 12,846 10,951 10,447 9,917
R2 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.08
Model 1 Model 4Model 2 Model 3
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Figure 1: The Size of CDS and Corporate Bond Market 
 
This figure displays the time trend of the outstanding notional amount of the credit default swap 
(CDS) and Corporate Bond market from December 2004 to June 2009 from Bank of 
International Settlement. The three data series represent the amount of the CDS contracts, the 
single-name CDS contracts and the corporate bonds respectively. 
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Figure 2: The Time Series of CDS-Bond Basis Indices 
 
This figure provides the time series plots of equally- and value-weighted CDS-Bond basis 
indices constructed from the corporate bonds between 2001 and 2008. The CDS-Bond basis is 
the difference between the CDS spread of a reference firm and the Z-spread of the corresponding 
firm’s cash corporate bond. Panel A presents the equally-weighted (EW) and value-weighted 
(VW) basis indices for investment grade bonds and Panel B for speculative grade bonds.  
 
Panel A: The Basis Index for Investment Grade Bonds 
 
‐250
‐200
‐150
‐100
‐50
0
50
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2008
Ba
si
s (b
ps
)
EW VW
 
 
Panel B: The Basis Index for Speculative Grade Bonds 
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